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ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR:
THE SINGAPORE JUDICIARY AT WORK
Gary Chan Kok Yew†
Abstract: This Article examines the concrete efforts and programs of the
Singapore judiciary to maintain and enhance access to justice for the poor. This
examination is undertaken via overlapping economic, procedural, and institutional
approaches. The Article will examine three main contentions. First, that the Singapore
judiciary’s concrete efforts in maintaining and promoting access to justice for the poor
have been fairly comprehensive and pro-active. Second, that abstract constitutional
discourse on the right of access to justice and the associated rights of legal representation
and legal aid are virtually absent in Singapore. Thus, the judicial practice for enhancing
access to justice for the poor has, to a large extent, surpassed its constitutional rhetoric.
Third, notwithstanding the concrete judicial efforts thus far, specific recommendations
are made with a view to further enhancing access to justice for the poor by the Singapore
judiciary.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is primarily centered on access to justice for the poor and
the roles and responsibilities of the Singapore courts. It is not concerned
with poverty alleviation per se,1 legal instruments to combat poverty,2 or the
efforts of the government and civil society to alleviate poverty in Singapore.
This paper instead examines the following issues: the meaning of the terms
“poverty” and “the poor,” the adverse effects of poverty on access to justice,
the programs implemented by the Singapore courts, and possible judicial
reforms necessary to enhance access to justice for the poor. Comparative
†
LL.B (Singapore); LL.M (London); M.A. Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore); B.A. Philosophy
(London); Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. An earlier draft
of the paper was presented at the Berlin 2007 International Conference: Law and Society in the 21st
Century, held from July 25-28, 2007. The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the funding by the
Office of Research at the Singapore Management University as well as the valuable data provided by the
Supreme Court and the Subordinate Courts of Singapore. The author also wishes to thank Eugene Tan for
his great help in reviewing portions of an earlier draft. Any errors or shortcomings belong to the author.
1
For works on poverty eradication and alleviation see JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY
(2005) (discussing the goal of ending extreme poverty in the world by 2025) and C. K. PRAHALAD, THE
FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID (Wharton School Publishing, 2006) (describing private-sector
involvement in eradicating poverty in developing countries).
2
Recently, in Hong Kong, an application for judicial review was taken out by a cleaner and a
Legislative Councillor to challenge the refusal of the Chief Executive in Council to fix minimum wages as
provided for in the Trade Boards Ordinance (Cap. 63). See Chan Noi Heung v. Chief Executive in Council,
[2007] (C.F.I.) (H.K.) (unpublished judgment), http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/doc/judg/word/vetted/other/
en/2006/HCAL000126_2006.doc. The Honourable Hartmann J dismissed the application on the grounds
that the Chief Executive in Council has not exercised his discretionary power to fix the minimum wages
contrary to the objects of the legislation. Id. In that case, the Chief Executive in Council chose instead to
take extra-legislative measures to combat poverty at the workplace. Id.
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developments in other jurisdictions such as England, the United States,
Australia, Hong Kong, and Malaysia will also be briefly discussed.
There are three main contentions examined in this Article. First, that
the Singapore judiciary’s concrete efforts in maintaining and promoting
access to justice for the poor have been fairly comprehensive and pro-active.
Second, that abstract constitutional discourse on the right of access to justice
and the associated rights of legal representation and legal aid are virtually
absent in Singapore. For this reason, the judicial practice of enhancing
access to justice for the poor has, to a large extent, surpassed its
constitutional rhetoric. Third, notwithstanding the concrete judicial efforts
thus far, specific recommendations are made with a view to further
enhancing access to justice for the poor by the Singapore judiciary.
A.

Socioeconomic Progress and Poverty in Singapore

Singapore’s socioeconomic progress from a Third World country to a
First World nation since its independence in 1965 has indeed been
remarkable.3 Its Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) per capita (in purchasing
power parity terms) was slightly more than US$28,000 in 2004 (comparable
to some OECD countries).4 The average annual GDP growth of Singapore
from 1965 to 2004 was an impressive eight percent.5 Life expectancy and
literacy rates have also risen in tandem, and the infant mortality rate has
fallen drastically.6 Singapore’s strong economic fundamentals have also
enabled it to emerge from the 1997 Asian financial crisis relatively
unscathed as compared to other Southeast Asian nations.7
Despite its impressive socioeconomic performance, the Singapore
island-state of approximately four and a half million people is not entirely
free of poverty issues. The figures may vary but they tell a similar story:
poverty exists in Singapore. In 1989, the Committee of Destitute Families

3
See The World Bank, Country Groups, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007)
(showing Singapore is regarded by the World Bank as a developed and high income economy). The recent
United Nations Human Development Report 2006 specified Singapore as a high-income and high human
development nation. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2006, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr06-complete.pdf.
4
See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 283. Note that the report also lists
corresponding figures for Germany (US$28,303), Italy (US$28,180), and France (US$29,300). Id.
5
See Winston T. H. Koh, Singapore’s Economic Growth Experience, in THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
OF SINGAPORE 1, 1 (Winston T. H. Koh & Roberto Mariano eds., 2006).
6
Id. at 1, 3.
7
Id. at 5.
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reported that 23,000 families in Singapore were living in poverty.8 In 1991,
an estimated 38,000 households fell below the minimum household
expenditure level.9 Approximately 11% of the resident population had
household incomes of less than half the median of a meager S$500 per
month in 1997.10
The worldwide trend of a widening income gap11 has also taken a
foothold in Singapore.12 According to the General Household Survey of
2005, while the average monthly household income between 2000 and 2005
rose for the top 80% of employed households, the income for the lowest
10% declined.13 The problem is not, unfortunately, merely manifested in
cold hard economic figures. There are also concomitant social repercussions
such as the social impact of job retrenchments, the creeping social divide,
and elitism.14 Notwithstanding the above discussion, the incidence of
poverty in Singapore has decreased markedly since its independence.15
Further, the current state of poverty in Singapore is relatively manageable
compared to the gravity and scale of extreme poverty encountered in parts of
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia.16

8
Sandra Davie, Panel’s Call to Govt To Ease Plight of 23,000 Poor Families, STRAITS TIMES
WKLY. OVERSEAS EDITION (Singapore), Mar. 13, 1993, cited in Garry Rodan, Class Transformations and
Political Tensions in Singapore’s Development, in THE NEW RICH IN ASIA 35 (Richard Robison & David S.
G. Goodman eds., 1996).
9
See William Lee, The Poor in Singapore: Issues and Options, 31(1) J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 57, 5758 (2001) (stating that the minimum level was set at S$510 for a four-person household living in a
one-room flat).
10
See SING. DEP’T OF STAT., HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION 1990-1997,
OCCASIONAL PAPER, ¶ 25 (1998).
11
See WORLD BANK, WORLD VIEW, 2007 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 4 (2007), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21298138~pagePK:
64133150.html. This is based on computations of fifty-nine countries in which forty-six recorded
increasing income disparity. Id.
12
See Aaron Low, Household Incomes up, Bottom Third’s Wages Down, STRAITS TIMES, Jun. 29,
2006, available at http://forums.vr-zone.com/archive/index.php/t-77598.html (indicating in the General
Household Survey that the Gini coefficient for Singapore has increased from 0.490 in 2000 to 0.522 in
2005).
13
See SING. DEP’T OF STAT., GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2005: TRANSPORT, OVERSEAS TRAVEL,
HOUSEHOLDS AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 28 (2005), http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/
ghsr2/ghs05r2.pdf (stating that the earnings of the low-income group have risen in absolute terms in 2006).
The income disparity persisted despite the fact that average household incomes rose from 2000 to 2005.
See Id. at 23. The average monthly household income from work for Singapore resident households in
2005 was S$5400 and the median household income was S$3830, an increase from 2000 figures. Id.
14
See, e.g., Wikipedia, Wee Shu Min Elitism Scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wee_Shu_Min_elitism_scandal (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (discussing the social implications that were
vividly highlighted in an elitist blog posted by a Singaporean teenage daughter of a Member of Parliament).
15
See Lee, supra note 9, at 58-59.
16
See SACHS, supra note 1, at 20-24 (stating that the number of poor people in East and South Asia,
as a whole, has, in fact, declined between 1990 and 2004). See WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 4.
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Poverty and Its Impact on Access to Justice

The traditional method of determining the level of poverty is based on
the number of people falling below a threshold income. This measure,
however, does not take into consideration two factors. First, the gap
between the existing poverty level and the amount required to bring the poor
to the threshold income level (known as “poverty gap”), and second, the
extent of inequality in the distribution of income amongst the poor.17
The above measure of poverty and the two factors, though important,
focus merely on income levels to identify poverty. Amartya Sen, a recipient
of the Nobel Prize for Economics, argues that this is not sufficient—poverty
must also be assessed by examining the “capability to function derivable
from those incomes.”18 In other words, a “poor” person is one who has
inadequate income to generate the required levels of functionality. This
Article adopts (and adapts) Sen’s definition of poverty in relation to access
to justice in Singapore. In this case, the “capability to function” refers to the
ability of the person to access justice within the parameters of the legal
system of Singapore. Thus, the “poor” that this Article focuses on are those
who have inadequate income that prevents them from obtaining access to
justice as required by their given situation. To reinforce the point, the focus
is the relative capability of the person to obtain access to the justice system
vis-à-vis the opposing litigant. In this regard, attention should be paid to the
costs of legal services and assistance in Singapore.
Singapore’s society is clearly concerned about legal costs, judging
from media reports and parliamentary debates as well as comments or
statements made by lawyers and judges.19 In particular, the Parliament has
debated the means test (the threshold income levels to assess the applicants’
eligibility) for state civil legal aid.20 There is also a notable concern with the
perceived high earnings of lawyers and law firms in Singapore.21
This definition of poverty as linked to access to justice may lead,
however, to problems in the determination of the group of poor people in
Singapore. Because a litigant’s ability to obtain access to justice in a given
situation depends on the type and extent of the legal problems he or she
encounters, it is impossible to pre-determine in advance a fixed threshold
17

See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES 9-23 (1981).
See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 111 (1992).
19
See Gary Chan, Re-examining Public Policy—A Case for Conditional Fees in Singapore?, 33
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 130-32 (2004).
20
See, e.g., 70 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, cols. 520-23, 526-27 (Mar. 9, 2001).
21
See generally SINGAPORE DEP’T. OF STAT., MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, CENSUS OF THE
LEGAL INDUSTRY AND PROFESSION (2001) [hereinafter CENSUS 2001].
18
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income below which a person is regarded as lacking access to justice. This
is also one of the reasons that stipulating a threshold income and/or asset
level to assess eligibility for legal aid is inadequate as a measure of poverty.
In this regard, the use of contingency or conditional fee agreements, which
are currently prohibited in Singapore,22 potentially offers more flexibility to
the litigant. Such agreements can provide the “sandwich” class, denied legal
aid under the income and asset thresholds, with greater access to legal
representation where the financial burden of having to pay the legal fees in
the event of losing the case is onerous.
Generally, poverty has an adverse impact on access to justice.
Litigating in the courts requires financial investment (i.e. lawyers’ fees, court
fees, and other disbursements) which may not be ultimately recouped by the
litigant, particularly if he or she loses the case. If an indigent litigant does
not possess the requisite financial muscle, he or she might naturally be
deterred from initiating court action, ceteris paribus. In addition, if he or
she has already instituted an action, such a litigant may be coerced to
discontinue the action due to insufficient funds, even if he or she has a
strong case.
The financial resources and ability of the economically poor to make
use of the legal system, as well as their ability to organize themselves for
legal action, are generally low. The poor are generally “one-shotters” within
the legal system as opposed to “repeat players,”23 such as large corporations.
A study conducted on persons aged eighteen years and above has indicated
that there is some positive correlation between the ownership of investments
and assets and the level of education.24 A recent in-house survey by the
Subordinate Courts revealed that a substantial majority of the litigants in
person in the family court and the small claims tribunals are from the low

22
Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 107(1)(b) (2001) (Sing.) (stating that the Singapore solicitor shall
not “enter into any agreement by which he is retained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other
contentious proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of success in that
suit, act or proceeding”). In addition, according to section 107(3) of the same Act, he is also subject to the
law of maintenance and champerty. See Professional Conduct Rules, r 37(b); Lau Liat Meng v.
Disciplinary Committee, [1965-1968] Sing. L. Rep. 9; Law Society of Singapore v. Chan Chow Wang,
[1972-1974] Sing. L. Rep. 636.
23
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L & SOC. REV. 95 (1974) (giving a general discussion concerning repeat players and oneshot players within the legal system). It is important to note that Galanter does not equate the “haves” with
repeat players and the “have-nots” with one-shotters. See id. at 103.
24
See Mei Khee Ng & Yee Liong Yap, Trends in Household Expenditure and Asset Ownership
1988-1998, STAT. SING. NEWSL. (Household and Population Statistics Division, Singapore Department of
Statistics), Jan. 2001, at 4-6; see also Lee, supra note 9, at 57 (stating that the poor in Singapore also
consists of a disproportionately high percentage of the Malay ethnic group and the elderly).
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income group and possess relatively low educational qualifications.25 The
problem is compounded when the indigent litigant is squared off against an
opponent who is well-off and financially able to weather delays and bear the
costs of litigation. In such a case, even if the well-off litigant has a weak
case, he or she is unlikely to be deterred from prolonging litigation. One
also has to bear in mind that litigation costs can be variable and uncertain,
factors which are likely to further prejudice the indigent litigant more than
the financially well-off party.
II.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE: WHERE JUDICIAL PRACTICE
TRIUMPHS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

The Singapore legal system is part of the English common law
tradition with stare decisis, or judicial precedents, as a fundamental pillar in
the development of local jurisprudence.26 The Singapore judicial hierarchy
is as follows: the highest court in the land is the Singapore Court of Appeal,
followed by the High Court (the Singapore Court of Appeal and High Court
are collectively called the “Supreme Court”), and then the Subordinate
Courts.27 The final right of appeal to the Privy Council in London was
abolished in 1994.28 Singapore judges play significant roles as arbiters of
legal disputes within the adversarial litigation process and, more generally,
in the administration of justice in Singapore.
A.

Abstract Constitutional Discourse on the Right of Access to Justice
Versus Concrete Judicial Practice in Singapore

Commentators have examined the conceptual and abstract question of
the legal status of the right of access to justice in Singapore—whether of a
constitutional or common law character—as well as the concomitant rights
of legal representation, legal aid, and issues relating to contingency fees.29
25

Centre for Research, eNnovation & Statistics (CReST) of the Subordinate Courts of Singapore,
Study on Parties in Person 2, 8-9 (July 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal) [hereinafter CReST Paper].
26
Gary Chan & Eugene Tan, Introduction to the Singapore Legal System, in BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
SINGAPORE BUSINESS LAW 3, 17-20 (Andrew Phang ed., 2004).
27
See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (2007 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “322” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Supreme Court of
Judicature Act” hyperlink). The Subordinate Courts consist of District Courts (including Family Courts),
Magistrates’ Courts, Juvenile Courts, Coroners’ Courts, and Small Claims Tribunals. See Subordinate
Courts Act, ch. 321, § 3(1) (2007 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “321” in
the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Subordinate Courts Act” hyperlink).
28
JUDICIAL COMM. ACT (1985) (repealed 1994).
29
See generally Gary Chan, The Right of Access to Justice: Judicial Discourse in Singapore and
Malaysia, 2 ASIAN J. COMP. L, art. 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2; see
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While the substantive constitutional right to legal counsel for a person
arrested by the police is expressly provided for in the Singapore
Constitution,30 the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the provision has
thus far been a restrictive one.31 Further, it appears that the rights to legal
aid32 and legal representation33 do not enjoy constitutional protection in
Singapore. According to the court rules, lawyers are assigned to accused
persons by the Singapore Supreme Court in every capital appeal case,34 but
these rules are not applicable to all other criminal cases.35 The right of
access to justice in the form of judicial review of administrative acts may be
ousted by the enactment of parliamentary legislation in Singapore.36
Contingency fee agreements between lawyers and clients, which potentially
increases access to justice to persons not eligible for legal aid but who
nonetheless find the legal fees beyond their means, are currently prohibited
in Singapore.37 There has also been little judicial discourse in the case law
on the general right of access to justice.38 In the same vein, there has been
little examination by Singapore courts of the associated rights to legal aid
and the feasibility of contingency fee agreements.39
However, significant statements have been made outside of
courtrooms in policy statements and speeches by judges of the Singapore
generally Li-Ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations –
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19
COLUMBIA J. ASIAN L. 428 (2005-2006).
30
SING. CONST. art. 9 (stating that, “[w]here a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as
may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner
of his choice.”).
31
See Chan, supra note 29, at 30-32.
32
See e.g., Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305 (1979) (addressing the obligation of a state to
provide civil legal aid under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms).
33
See generally Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club, [1993] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 388 (holding that the
right of legal representation is based on the principle of natural justice so as to ensure that the litigant is
able to present his or her case effectively to a tribunal).
34
Sing. Sup. Ct. (Crim. App.) R. 11(a) (1997) (making only reference to capital cases). Rule 11 (b)
applies to other criminal appeal cases where the Chief Justice considers it in the “interests of justice."
35
Id.
36
See Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1988] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 132, 162-64 (discussing
the objective test in reviewing ministerial discretion in issuing preventive orders under the Internal Security
Act); see also Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs and Others, [1989] Sing. L. Rep, 449
(highlighting constitutional revisions relating to judicial review); see also Internal Security Act, ch. 143
(Act 2 of 1995 – Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989) (Sing.) (amending the Internal Security Act
limiting the right to judicial review).
37
Supra note 22.
38
See Chan, supra note 29, at 21-25, 39-40. See Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor 1 Malayan L.
J. 64 (1980) (holding that the rule of law incorporates fundamental principles of the common law, including
access to justice).
39
See Chan, supra note 29, at 32-39.

602

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 3

courts, including the former Chief Justice Yong Pung How, underlining the
importance of promoting access to justice for the poor.40 The Singapore
Subordinate Courts’ Justice Statement has also explicitly endorsed “access to
justice” as one of its two primary aims.41 Furthermore, recent public
statements by the current Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong on fairness and
justice suggest some optimism in the horizon for rights-based jurisprudence
in Singapore.42
Whatever the content or scope of substantive rights, if the practical
implementation of schemes to “concretize” these substantive rights is absent
or seriously lacking, such rights will nonetheless appear to be mere rhetoric.
Professor Deborah Rhode contended that, in the United States, the
constitutional jurisprudence and ideal of equal justice is not reflected in the
legal system as practiced.43 She calls it the “shameful gap between our
rhetorical commitments and daily practices concerning access to justice.”44
It is argued that, in Singapore, the situation is, to a considerable extent, the
reverse of what Professor Rhode described of the U.S. system. As discussed
infra, concrete efforts have been made by the Singapore judiciary to
maintain and promote access to justice for the poor in society, despite the
relative absence of explicit articulation by the Singapore courts of
rights-based jurisprudence (in particular, the scope and limits of rights
relating to access to justice). The implementation of programs and plans in
Singapore seeking to maintain or promote access to justice are more
pronounced than a reading of Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence on
access to justice would suggest. Nevertheless, there are shortcomings or
areas which may be improved upon.

40
Subordinate Courts 12th Workplan 2003/2004, Anchoring Justice, Subordinate Courts Annual
Report 1, 7 (2003). Former Chief Justice Yong Pung How said “the Judiciary must guard against the
obstruction of justice, or more accurately, access to justice. We must strive to ensure that the public, and
especially those who are indigent, can seek the redress available through the judicial process . . . .”
(emphasis added). Id.
41
See The Justice Statement, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4397 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2007).
42
Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice, Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek
Keong (Apr. 22, 2006), ¶¶ 4-5, 11-13 (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.
aspx?pgID=1001). The present Chief Justice Chan has explicitly stated that “[t]he fair administration of
justice must ultimately trump court efficiency and convenience” in the event of a conflict. Id.
43
DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004).
44
Id. at 5.
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THREE JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE:
ECONOMIC, PROCEDURAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL

The public perception of the Singapore judiciary has been favorable.
According to a public survey of 1000 participants carried out by Forbes
Research Pte. Ltd. in 2001, an overwhelming majority of the public strongly
supported the work of the Subordinate Courts.45 Another public survey was
carried out in 2006 on the Subordinate Courts.46 The respondents consisted
of a substantial majority of Singaporeans (91%) as well as a small
percentage of permanent residents (9%). The results largely corroborated
those contained in the 2001 survey and pointed to a high level of confidence
in the judiciary.47
The performance of the Singapore judiciary has also been
internationally acclaimed.48 In terms of “legal framework,” the Singapore
judiciary placed second after Hong Kong in the Institute for Management
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005.49 Moreover, the
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, an international consulting firm
providing business information to companies in East and Southeast Asia, has
ranked Singapore second in Asia for the quality of its judicial system.50
Notwithstanding favorable public perception and international
acclaim, it is nevertheless pertinent to ask whether the Singapore judiciary
45
The main findings obtained from the Subordinate Courts survey showed, based on approximately
1000 interviews, that: 92% of respondents agreed that there is trust and confidence in the fair
administration of justice in Singapore; 94% agreed that the Courts are effective in upholding law and order;
91% opined that the Courts administer justice fairly to all regardless of language, religion, race, or social
class; 95% agreed that the Courts independently carry out justice according to the law; and 88% agreed that
the Courts should continue to impose deterrent sentences, especially for offenders with any previous
criminal records. (Survey on file with author.)
46
SINGAPORE SUBORDINATE COURTS, SURVEY ON ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTION OF THE SINGAPORE
SUBORDINATE COURTS 2006, (Nov. 2006) (on file with author). The survey was based on face-to-face
interviews with over 1000 randomly selected respondents. Id. The author has been informed by the
Subordinate Courts of Singapore that the survey was carried out during the period from September 11 to
October 8, 2006, by an independent research company, Nexus Link Pte. Ltd.
47
Id. The following are statements asked during the survey about the Singapore judiciary with
percentages representing respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement: the confidence
in the fair administration of justice (93%); the accessibility of the court’s facilities (86%); the efficiency of
the courts (89%); the fair administration of justice regardless of language, religion, race or social class
(95%); and carrying out of justice according to law without influences of others (91%). Id.
48
See Karen Blochlinger, Primus Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among Equals?, 9
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 591, 616-17 (2000); Tan Ooi Boon, Happy Retirement, CJ, NEW PAPER, Apr. 10,
2006 (“From the day he became CJ in 1991, ‘public access’ were the two words foremost in his mind.”)
49
See
SUBORDINATE
COURTS
ANNUAL
REPORT
2005
53
(2005),
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4469.
50
See POLITICAL & ECONOMIC RISK CONSULTANCY LTD., ASIAN INTELLIGENCE (2006) (on file with
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also JAMES GWARTNEY, ROBERT LAWSON, & WILLIAM
EASTERLY, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD REPORT 2006 (2006).
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has indeed lived up to the expectations of enhancing access to justice for the
poor. In order to respond to the question, this central Section adopts a
three-fold approach. The activities, programs, and schemes undertaken by
the Singapore courts with a view toward enhancing access to justice may be
conveniently categorized as economic, procedural, and institutional (or
organizational).51
In this context, the economic approach refers to direct fiscal measures
undertaken by the Singapore judiciary to reduce the economic burden or
lower the economic barriers to access to the courts encountered by indigent
litigants. The procedural approach refers to court procedures and rules used
to enhance access to justice for litigants. This may include procedural
reforms such as amending court rules, developing the rules of locus standi
through case law, and streamlining court processes to reduce delays in the
judicial system. While institutional measures could embody procedural
measures, they tend to be large-scale and often require an overhaul in the
way the court’s roles are conceived. This third category includes the
workings of the small claims tribunals, court-based mediation, the use of
technology, as well as judicial approaches towards legal aid, pro bono work,
and litigants in person.52
Before discussing the three judicial approaches to access to justice, it
should be noted that absolute access to justice is not necessarily a desirable
objective. First, access to justice requires funding of legal services which
would mean less investment in other important areas such as education and
health. Second, a balance should be properly struck between promoting
access to justice for the poor and ensuring that the indigent litigant acts
responsibly before initiating action. Imagine a scenario where the
government holds a largesse for implementing legal aid programs. This does
not mean that the government should dole out monies indiscriminatingly to
all persons below a specified income level with a view to enhancing access
to justice for the poor. Indeed, a serious-minded government would be
concerned with irresponsible litigation in the guise of vexatious and
frivolous claims, an undesirable feature of over-litigiousness in society. Part
of this problem of vexatious and frivolous claims may be resolved by the
51
See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice As A Focus of Research, 1 WINDSOR
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE ix, x-xiv (1981). In a similar (though not precisely the same) fashion,
Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth described the access-to-justice movement as comprising three waves
of reform, namely: 1) procedural availability of lawyers to the poor, 2) providing legal representation for
diffuse interests, and 3) experimenting with new forms of representation and new dispute processing
institutions.
52
Commonly referred to as pro se litigants in the United States and unrepresented litigants in
Australia.
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filtering mechanisms of a competent judicial system. But costs may already
be wasted midway through the judicial process. Thus, the government
would also want to minimize waste at the earliest stage possible, such as
when the litigant applies for legal aid from the state legal aid authority. State
legal aid authorities may, for example, implement a merits test to assess the
viability of claims sought by applicants for aid. Thus, in the final analysis,
the actual implementation of access to justice programs involves a balancing
of the qualitative objective of extending access and the quantitative aim of
preventing unnecessary litigation and waste of costs. As one judge wittingly
noted, “[j]ustice may be priceless. But it is not costless.”53
A.

Economic Measures Have Been Utilized to Control and Manage
Litigation Costs

The role of alleviating poverty generally belongs to the government.
In this respect, the Singapore government has stoutly resisted implementing
a general welfare system.54 In fact, the Singapore government has criticized
the vagaries and “crutch” mentality associated with welfare states.55
Recently, it has resisted calls for greater increases in the amount of public
assistance for the needy.56 In the face of such criticism and dissatisfaction,
the government has often emphasized its role in distributing monetary handouts to benefit the needy, and its focus on “workfare” instead of welfare to
assist older low-income earners.57 Since the 1980s, the government has
established ethnic self-help groups such as the Chinese Development
53

See Sir Ivor Richardson, Courts and Access to Justice, 31 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 163, 171

(2000).
54
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister, Singapore, statement in Parliament (Nov. 13, 2006) (saying
“[w]e have treated welfare as a dirty word. The opposition, I think the Worker’s Party, has called for a
‘permanent unconditional needs-based welfare system.’ I think that is an even dirtier five words . . . .” ) in
82 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, cols. 745-48 (Nov. 13, 2006).
55
See M. Ramesh, Social Security in Singapore: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary 32 (12)
ASIAN SURVEY 1093, 1103 (1992).
56
The cash grant of S$260 under the Public Assistance scheme was only increased by between S$30
and S$115 per month to take into consideration inflation and to counteract the hike in the Good and
Services Tax from the existing 5% to 7%. See Jasmine Yin, Money Not Enough: MP Neo, TODAY ONLINE,
Mar. 10, 2007.
57
See, e.g., MINISTER OF FINANCE, SINGAPORE BUDGET STATEMENT 2007 28, ¶ 4.8, (2007),
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2007/budget_speech/downloads/FY2007_Budget_Statement.pdf.
The
workfare scheme is envisaged to complement the existing Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) contributions by
both employer and employee, a social security scheme to ensure adequate retirement savings. See id. The
government will provide the low-income workers with income supplements to be paid partly in cash and
partly into the CPF. Id. ¶ 4.10. At the same time, the workers will contribute less to the CPF so as to
increase their take-home pay. Employers contribute less to the CPF so that the cost of employing the
worker decreases. This is expected to increase worker employability. To counter the increase in the Goods
and Services Tax (GST), GST credits are given out in the form of cash to Singaporeans, with lower-income
earners obtaining a larger amount than persons in the higher-income category. Id. ¶ 6.3.
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Assistance Council, Mendaki, and the Singapore Indian Development
Association in order to raise the living standards and education of the
respective ethnic groups.58 It has also encouraged private and volunteer
organizations,59 as well as the community, to share the burden of providing
social services to the disadvantaged.60
By contrast, Singapore’s judiciary, comprised of unelected judges,
does not assist directly in alleviating poverty. The Singapore judiciary (both
the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts) is, however, allocated a budget
each year with which to achieve its targeted outcomes with respect to the
administration of justice.61 This Section focuses on fiscal measures the
Singapore Judiciary has undertaken to enhance access to justice for the poor
in Singapore.
1.

Imposition of Hearing Fees and Other Court Fees

The imposition of hearing and court fees may have serious
ramifications for access to justice, as evidenced in the English case of
Witham.62 There, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to increase court fees
under the U.K. Supreme Court Act 1981.63 The new regulations64 removed
provisions that had exempted and remitted fees for litigants. Upon
reviewing the new regulations, the English court determined that the
58
See Gillian Koh & Ooi Giok Ling, Relationship Between State and Civil Society in Singapore:
Clarifying the Concepts, Assessing the Ground in CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 167, 171 (Lee Hock
Guan ed., 2004).
59
See id. at 170-71. Apart from ethnic and clan groups, the private organizations include
religion-based community welfare services, philanthropic foundations, and other non-governmental
organizations.
60
For works on government and civil society involvement, see generally Suzaina Kadir,
Engagement and Autonomy Within The Political Status Quo, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE, 324-54 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004); Koh &
Ling, supra note 58, at 171; Yayoi Tanaka, Subtle NGO Control by a Developmentalist Welfare State, in
THE STATE AND NGOS: PERSPECTIVES FROM ASIA, 200-221 (Shinichi Shigetomi ed., 2002). For the
relationship between the state and the voluntary welfare sector see David Seth Jones, Welfare and Public
Management in Singapore: A Study of State and Voluntary Sector Partnership, 24(1) ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN.
57 (2002).
61
See
Gov’t
of
Sing.,
Budget
2007-Expenditure
Overview,
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2007/expenditure_overview/judicature.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). In
fiscal year 2007, the Judiciary was allocated a total of S$119.56 million consisting of S$68 million
(Supreme Court) and S$51.56 million (Subordinate Courts). In fiscal year 2006, the total allocation was
S$124 million, consisting of S$57 million (Supreme Court operations), S$13 million (final payments for
the construction of the Supreme Court Building) and S$54 million (Subordinate Courts operations): see
Gov’t
of
Sing.,
Budget
2006-Expenditure
Overview,
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2006/expenditure_overview/judicature.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
62
R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, (1998) Q.B. 575 (U.K.).
63
Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 130 (U.K.).
64
Supreme Court Fees (Amendment) Order, 1996, S.I. 1996/3191, L. 15, art. 3 (Supreme Court of
England and Wales).
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regulations were indeed ultra vires as they denied the applicant his
constitutional right of access to justice.65 There has not, however, been a
similar constitutional challenge in Singapore.
Hearing fees were introduced in the Singapore Supreme Court in
199366 and in the Subordinate Courts in 1994.67 The official rationale for the
imposition of hearing fees was to ensure that the litigants would use court
time responsibly and expeditiously.68 Singapore has put in place measures to
address concerns that access to justice may have been impeded or truncated
by the imposition of such fees. First, the amount of hearing fees imposed
depends on the level of court in which a civil case is litigated69 and the
number of hearing days required. Significantly lower fees are applicable for
claims commenced in lower courts. No hearing fees are imposed in the first
three days of hearing in the High Court and the first day of hearing before
the Court of Appeal, district court, and magistrate’s court.70 There are also
important exclusions of certain types of proceedings from the hearing fees
levy.71
Second, the registrar of the court is empowered to adjust the fees of
litigants in specific circumstances. Upon the application of a litigant, the
registrar72 may apportion the fees among all or any of the litigants.73
65

R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, (1998) Q.B. 575, 586 (U.K.).
Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules 1993 S. 213/93, Order 90A (Sing.); JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL
JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000).
67
Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Rules 1994, S 260/94, (Sing.); JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE
IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000).
68
JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000); JEFFREY PINSLER, SINGAPORE COURT
PRACTICE 2006 1780 (2006).
69
The hearing fees for each day or part thereof after the first day are S$250 (Magistrates’ Courts)
and S$500 (District Courts). See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 1(1). With
respect to the High Court, where the “value” of the claim is S$1 million or below, the hearing fee per day
correlates positively to the number of hearing days: the fee for the fourth day amounts to S$6000; the fee
for the fifth day is S$2000; between the sixth and tenth day, litigants pay S$3000 per day; beyond the tenth
day, the fee amounts to S$5000 per day. Id. In the event the “value” of the claim exceeds S$1 million, the
corresponding amounts of hearing fees for the abovementioned hearing periods are S$9000, S$3000,
S$5000, and S$7000 respectively. Id. For hearings before the Court of Appeal, the hearing fees for each
day or part thereof subsequent to the first day is a fixed sum of S$4000 (for “value” of up to S$1 million)
and S$6000 (for “value” of more than S$1 million) respectively. Id; see also id. at Order 91 r. 1(3) (listing
the rules for determining the “value” of the claim).
70
Id.
71
For example, actions for damages for death or personal injuries and causes or matters under the
Adoption of Children Act, Guardianship of Infants Act and Women’s Charter have been exempted. See
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 3.
72
The Registrar of the Supreme Court of the Subordinate Courts (as the case may be), see Rules of
Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 1, r. 4., is a legally qualified person appointed under section 61 of
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, Cap. 322, 2007 Rev. Ed., and section 12 of the Subordinate Courts
Act, Cap. 321, 2007 Rev. Ed., respectively to exercise both judicial and administrative powers and duties.
73
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 5.
66
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Alternatively, the registrar may waive or defer payment of the fees
altogether to alleviate the litigant’s financial burden.74 Though the specific
financial criteria are not explicitly stated in the Rules of Court, the aggrieved
party is entitled to apply to the High Court to review the registrar’s
decision.75 According to the registrar of the Supreme Court, the financial
condition of the litigant will be taken into consideration in determining the
requests for waiver or deferment.76 In fact, in order to reduce the economic
burden on the poor, there have at times been general reductions or waivers
of hearing fees by the Singapore judiciary to account for adverse economic
conditions affecting court users.77
In December 2002, hearing fees were revised upwards in reaction to
the judiciary’s concerns that an “inordinate number of court days” were
required in an increasing number of cases.78 The former Chief Justice Yong,
however, explained that the upwards revision affected only a small portion
of cases.79 A large majority of the cases affected involved high-value
businesses. The fee revision was also a necessary response to the increase in
the total operating costs of the Supreme Court.80 Significantly, the former
Chief Justice added that “access to justice should not be denied to those who
do not have the financial means.81 As such, the registrar has the discretion to
waive or defer the payment of fees in cases of genuine hardship.”82
The amount of court fees levied is determined by the Chief Justice or
the Senior District Judge with the concurrence of the Chief Justice.83 As
74

Id. at r. 1(3), r. 2(3).
Id. at r. 6. As of May 9, 2007, however, the Supreme Court has confirmed that it has not received
any requests for review of the Registrar’s decisions. With respect to the Subordinate Courts, see Loh
Chong Yong Thomas v. Standard Chartered Bank, [2007] S.G.D.C. 82, ¶ 6, in which an application for the
waiver of court fees was made by the plaintiff (a practicing lawyer who was bankrupt). The application
was dismissed by the deputy registrar, and the appeal to the District Judge in chambers was also dismissed.
76
See E-mail from the registrar of the Supreme Court to author (May 9, 2007) (on file with the
author).
77
Hearing fees were waived for the first three days of hearings before a judge of the High Court
pursuant to the Rules of Court (Amendment) Rules 2003 during the global economic downturn arising from
the Iraq War and outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) to “[a]meliorate the impact of
the current economic downturn facing litigants . . . .” See Media Release, Singapore Supreme Court,
Waiver of Hearing Fees in the High Court (May 23, 2003), http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/
default.aspx?pgid=424&printFriendly=true.
78
See Chief Justice Yong Pung How, Chief Justice’s Response: Opening of the Legal Year 2003, ¶
19 (Jan. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgid=
504&printFriendly=true).
79
Id. ¶ 21.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. See also Revision of Hearing Fees and Filing Fees, Registrar’s Circular No. 5, 2002, (Supreme
Court of Singapore), http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/99/2002%20-%205.pdf (last
visited Feb. 29, 2008).
83
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 91, r. 2.
75
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with hearing fees, the registrar possesses the discretion to waive and defer
the payment of the fees in whole or in part.84 Moreover, lower court fees are
levied for proceedings falling under specific legislation, such as the Mental
Disorders and Treatment Act, the Adoption of Children Act, the
Guardianship of Infants Act, or the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act.85
According to the Singapore Supreme Court, fees are waived for the
inspection of court files by particular categories of persons, namely
applicants that work for certain public agencies and persons receiving legal
aid from the Legal Aid Bureau.86
2.

Judicial Supervision over Litigation Costs

In Singapore, a litigant’s legal costs include solicitor-client costs, the
litigant’s own costs as well as the litigant’s own disbursements.87 The
solicitor-client costs generally constitute a major component of legal costs.88
Unlike in the United States, should the prospective litigant in Singapore lose
his or her case, the fee-shifting rules (as in England) typically require that he
or she bear the opposing party’s costs,89 which can be financially onerous.
Nevertheless, this fee-shifting requirement under Singapore law is not
an invariable rule.90 Moreover, legal costs in Singapore are not regarded as
being unduly high. In fact, Asia-Pacific Legal 500, an information guide to
law firms in the region, reported that lawyers’ fees in Singapore are
generally competitive.91 However, as discussed below, lower income
earners nevertheless find legal costs in Singapore financially burdensome.
84

Id. r. 5.
See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), app. B, ¶¶ 117-31.
86
These applicants are the Police, Internal Security Department, the Commercial Affairs
Department, the Singapore Academy of Law, the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Insolvency and
Public Trustee’s Office. See E-mail from the Registrar of the Supreme Court to author (May 9, 2007) (on
file with the author).
87
Disbursements include court fees, for example, hearing fees and fees levied on the submission and
registration of court documents.
88
In a typical case, the disbursements would take up only a small proportion of the litigant’s total
costs.
89
See the general “costs follow the event” rule in Rules of the Court, Order 59 r. 3(2); Tullio v.
Maoro, [1994] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 489.
90
The Court has the discretion to depart from the general “costs follow the event” rule. See id.; see
also the recent English case of R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
[2005] 1 W.L.R. 2600 (where the court granted a protective costs order in public law cases of general
public importance to enable claimants of limited means access to the court without the fear of substantial
costs order being made against them); cf. Arkin v. Bouchard Lines Ltd. (Nos. 2 & 3), [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055
(which held that third party professional funders for a claimant with limited means via a non-champertous
agreement, with the expectation of reward if the claimant succeeded, were liable to pay costs to the
successful defendants in the action).
91
According to ASIA-PACIFIC LEGAL 500, “Singapore's legal market is extremely competitive. Fees
remain at relatively low levels, particularly among Singaporean clients who, as a result, receive some of the
85
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Under the Singapore civil justice system, the courts have the power to
determine the party-party costs as well as solicitor-client costs in the taxation
of costs.92 The courts may supervise litigation costs, whether in the context
of a costs agreement between disputing parties or outside the parameters of a
costs agreement.
The courts supervise contentious business agreements on solicitorclient costs based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness as
provided for in the Legal Profession Act.93 In this context, the Singapore
High Court in Shamsudin bin Embun v. P T Seah & Co.94 held that in a case
where the client seeks to impeach the fairness and reasonableness of a
contentious business agreement for costs, it is the lawyer who bears the onus
of proving its fairness and reasonableness.95 In determining whether the
agreement passed the criterion of fairness, the issue was whether, on the
facts, the client understood the contents of the agreement. In the present
case, the Court took note of the need to protect the client, a “poor old, retired
pensioner who had always had a low station in life, [and who] was ignorant
of the law and its arcane procedures.”96
The judicial power of supervision overcosts on the basis of fairness
and reasonableness extends even to situations where a prior agreement
required the client to pay higher costs. In Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo
Hao,97 the High Court stated that there was no conclusive presumption under
the Rules of Court98 that the amount expressly or impliedly approved by the
client would be reasonable in amount.99 Citing section 113 of the Legal
Profession Act,100 the judge held that the costs agreement was not immune
best-value legal advice in the world . . . .” cited in 74 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES REPORT, col.
1211 (May 15, 2002). The CENSUS 2001 included a survey which incorporated data on the earnings of
lawyers in relation to the median billable rate per hour in 2000. See CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 4. The
median billable rate per hour was as follows: S$200-S$299 (for lawyers with fewer than three years of
experience); S$300-S$399 (for lawyers with between three and twelve years of experience); and
S$400-S$499 (for lawyers with more than twelve years of experience). Id.
92
Taxation of costs refers to the determination by the court as to the amount of costs payable by one
party to another or by a client to the solicitor, as the case may be. Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed.
(Sing.), Order 59, r. 27-28.
93
The court is empowered under the Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161, § 113 (Sing.) to enforce the
agreement; where the terms of the agreement are deemed by the court to be unfair or unreasonable, it may
be declared void.
94
Shamsudin bin Embun v. P T Seah & Co., [1986] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 510.
95
Id. at 516.
96
Id. at 518. The costs agreement was also adjudged “unreasonable” as the lawyer was “dilatory” in
the prosecution of the client’s case which was of “ordinary simplicity.” Id. at 519.
97
Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74.
98
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, r. 28(2)(b).
99
Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74, 82-84.
100
Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161 (Sing.).
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from investigation by the court.101 Indeed, based on the facts of the case, as
the amount of costs agreed to was “jarringly out of proportion” to that for
similar work done by a lawyer, the presumption was rebutted.102
The judiciary also supervises legal costs outside the context of costs
agreements. For example, legal costs are pre-determined under Order 59,
Appendix 2 of the Rules of Court, where the amount of costs is positively
correlated to the damages claimed or awarded in motor accident cases in
respect to party-party costs.103 There are also specific provisions relating to
the litigants receiving legal aid from the Legal Aid Bureau as well as the
litigants in person. To protect the legally-aided person, he or she should not
be liable for both the court fees and the costs to the other party should the
opposing party win.104 As for the litigant in person without formal legal
representation, the Singapore legal position is that such a person is entitled
to such costs as would reasonably compensate him or her for time expended,
together with all expenses reasonably incurred.105
As another example of the supervisory role adopted by the courts, it is
statutorily provided that, if an action commenced in the High Court could
have been initiated in the lower courts (district and magistrates’ courts), and
the plaintiff recovers an amount not exceeding the relevant lower court limit,
the plaintiff is only entitled to (lower) costs generally awarded on the lower
court scale.106 The explicit judicial rationale for such practice, apart from
preventing abuse of the judicial process, lies in fostering a cheaper and more
efficient process.107 In Cheong Ghim Fah v. Murugian s/o Rangasamy (No.
2), the High Court reasoned that lawyers should not incur unnecessary costs
if a more economical and equally expeditious process of dispute resolution,
such as in the Subordinate Courts, exists. 108
In summation, the Singapore judiciary has put in place fairly
comprehensive economic measures, whether by promulgating rules or
through its court decisions, to control and manage litigation costs, including
lawyers’ fees, solicitor-client costs, party-party costs, court fees, and hearing
fees.

101

Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74, 84.
Id.
103
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, app. 2.
104
Legal Aid and Advice Act, 2001, c. 160, § 12(4) (Sing.). The legally-aided person is, however,
entitled to the costs if he wins.
105
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, r. 18A.
106
Subordinate Courts Act, 1999, c. 321, § 39 (Sing.).
107
See Uni-Navigation v. Wei Loong Shipping, [1993] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 876, 880 (per Selvam J.C.).
108
Cheong Ghim Fah v. Murugian s/o Rangasamy (No. 2), [2004] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 193, 195.
102
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B.

Litigation and Court Procedures Have Been Utilized to Enhance
Access to Justice

An examination of the judicial role in enhancing access to justice
would not be complete without a discussion of litigation and court
procedures as interpreted and applied by the courts. As Justice Andrew
Phang of the Singapore Court of Appeal observed, the procedural aspects of
a particular case can profoundly affect substantive justice and vice versa in a
mutual and integrative process:
The quest for justice . . . entails a continuous need to balance
the procedural with the substantive. More than that, it is a
continuous attempt to ensure that both are integrated, as far as
that is humanly possible. Both interact with each other. One
cannot survive without the other. There must, therefore, be—as
far as is possible—a fair and just procedure that leads to a fair
and just result. This is not merely abstract theorising. It is the
very basis of what the courts do—and ought to do. When in
doubt, the courts would do well to keep these bedrock
principles in mind. This is especially significant because, in
many ways, this is how, I believe, laypersons perceive the
administration of justice to be. The legitimacy of the law in
their eyes must never be compromised. On the contrary, it
should, as far as is possible, be enhanced.109
Such procedural measures are found in legislation, rules of court, and the
administrative circulars and practice directions issued by the courts.
Procedure involves judicial case management, streamlining litigation, and
court procedures. This Article focuses on the manner and extent to which
the procedures, as interpreted and applied by the courts, affect the level of
access to justice of the poor in Singapore. The central issues examined in
this Section are: 1) the extent that the poor are capable of organizing
themselves to obtain remedies under existing litigation procedures (such as
the use of relator actions, rules of locus standi, and representative actions)
and 2) the extent that courts have reformed and developed procedural rules
and guidelines and have streamlined the judicial processes to enable the poor
to obtain greater access to justice, bearing in mind that procedures should
not get in the way of the litigants’ substantive claims and rights.110
109
110

J.C.A.).

United Overseas Bank Limited v. Ng Huat Foundations Pte. Ltd., [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 425, ¶ 8.
See Sivaras Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia, [2002] 2 Malayan L. J. 413, 422 (Gopal Sri Ram
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Relator Actions Are Not Useful for Enhancing Access to Justice for
the Poor

In relator actions, one or more members of the public who wish to
protect public interests can sue in the name of the Attorney-General.111
Insofar as access to justice for the poor is concerned, relator actions against
the government appear to be non-starters, though the technical procedural
requirements of such an action are specifically provided for in the Rules of
Court.112 This is because relator actions, which require the Attorney-General
to initiate an action for the purpose of vindicating public rights against the
government, are arguably contrary to the role of the Attorney-General as the
government legal adviser.113 Not surprisingly, relator actions against the
government are rare in Singapore.
While there has been no clear pronouncement by the Singapore courts
on relator actions, the viability of relator actions in the context of public
interest litigation has been explicitly thrown into doubt by the Malaysian
courts. Although Malaysian court decisions are not binding on the
Singapore judiciary, the logic of the dissenting justices in the Malaysian
decision below, insofar as relator actions against the government are
concerned, is compelling. The argument is particularly persuasive given that
the constitutional provisions concerning the duty of the Attorney-General as
the government legal advisor are similar in Singapore and Malaysia.
In Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang,114 the Respondent, an
opposition politician, sought an injunction to restrain a company from
signing a highway construction contract with the Malaysian government on
the basis of allegations of corruption. The Malaysian Supreme Court had
earlier granted an interlocutory injunction115 but an application was
subsequently sought to set this injunction aside.116 In Lim Kit Siang v.
United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), the Malaysian high court dismissed the

111
See, e.g., Singapore Government Proceedings Act, 1985, c. 121, §§ 8-9, on actions relating to
public nuisance and trusts for public, religious, social and charitable purposes.
112
Rules of the Court, Order 15, r. 11.
113
CONST. SING. art. 35, §7. According to article 35, section 7 of the Constitution, “It shall be the
duty of the Attorney-General to advise the Government upon such legal matters and to perform such other
duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the President or the
Cabinet and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other written
law.”
114
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12.
115
Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 53 (Tan Sri Lee
Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo), Tan Sri Wan Suleiman and Tan Sri Wan Hamzah S.C. JJ.). The order for
injunction was made with liberty to the parties to apply. Id.
116
Id.
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application.117 On appeal, the majority judges118 in Government of Malaysia
v. Lim Kit Siang refused to grant the injunction, regarding the action by the
respondent as vexatious, frivolous, and an abuse of the judicial process.119
The dissenting judge, Seah S.C.J., argued persuasively that a relator action is
not applicable in public interest litigation to test the legality of governmental
action.120 This is because the Attorney General, as the principal legal
advisor of the Cabinet and/or Minister of the Government of Malaysia, is not
expected under the Federal Constitution to consent to the initiation of such
court proceedings.121 Indeed, the Attorney General is mandated to defend
the action as part of his constitutional duty.122 Abdoolcader S.C.J., the other
dissenting judge, opined that the “question of a relator action must
necessarily remain attractive as a theoretical possibility with no conceivable
hope generally for practical purposes of advancing to concrete action beyond
that.”123 It should also be observed that V.C. George J. in the Malaysian high
court case of Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd. (No. 2)124 referred
to relator actions in the name of the Attorney General as “archaic and
impracticable.” In view of the above considerations, relator actions are
likely not feasible as a means for enhancing access to justice for the poor in
litigation against the government.
However, relator actions against non-government bodies such as the
Law Society and private pro bono organizations to vindicate a right of
access to justice are not precluded by the same legal reasoning applicable to
relator actions against the government.
In the Malaysian case of
Attorney-General at and by the Relation of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota
(Commissioner Of The Federal Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong
(“Wan Kam Fong”),125 relator actions were explicitly endorsed against the
Defendant, a private entity that was carrying on a restaurant business
without a license. The court held that the Attorney General was empowered
under the English common law to bring a relator action pursuant to section

117

Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 64 (V.C. George

J.).
118
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12 (Salleh Abas L.P., Abdul
Hamid C.J., and Hashim Yeop A. Sani S. C.J).
119
Id. at 12.
120
Id. at 36.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 45.
124
Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd. (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 59.
125
Attorney-General at and by the Relation of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (Commissioner Of The Federal
Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong, [1967] 2 Malayan L. J. 72.
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three of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956.126 Significantly, the Defendants had
contended, in a similar vein to the arguments made in Lim Kit Siang, that
relator actions could not succeed since the Malaysian Constitution provided
that the Attorney General was the adviser of the government.127 However,
this argument was rejected by the judge.128 The defendant in Wan Kam Fong
was not a government body, unlike in Lim Kit Siang.
The positive outcome from cases such as Wan Kam Fong appears to
be that relator actions, though impracticable with respect to actions against
the government, remain applicable to vindicate a right of access to justice
against a non-government body, provided that the existence of a public
wrong caused by the defendant can be established. With respect to the
Singapore Law Society in particular, one of its aims is to “protect and assist
the public in Singapore in all matters touching or ancillary or incidental to
the law” under the Legal Profession Act.129 It is also required under the
same statute to “make provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme
whereby impecunious persons on non-capital charges are represented by
advocates.”130 In view of these statutory provisions, in the event that the
Law Society decides to terminate or scale back drastically its criminal legal
aid programs, an argument may be made by an indigent litigant that he or
she has been denied access to justice due to the breach of the statutory
obligation by the Law Society. The problem with this reliance on relator
actions, however, is that the burden of the government in providing access to
justice may be perceived to have been unfairly shifted to other
non-government organizations or bodies. Hence, the relator action per se is
not a persuasive and rational procedural technique to enhance access to
judicial remedies for the poor.

126
Id. at 73. On the facts, however, there were certain procedural defects relating to the filing of the
relator’s prior consent to act and hence, the writ was set aside. Id.
127
Id. See also MALAYSIAN CONST. art. 145(2). Article 145(2) of the Malaysian Constitution reads:
“It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Cabinet or any
Minister upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to
time be referred or assigned to him by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Cabinet, and to discharge the
functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other written law.” The Yang di-Pertuan
Agong is the head of the Executive in Malaysia.
128
Raja Azlan Shah J. noted: “If the contention of [the defendants’ lawyer] truly represents the law of
this country, it would be deplorable. It would mean that the Attorney-General who is the guardian of
public rights is not competent to bring a relator action to restrain interference with a public right or to abate
a public nuisance or to compel the performance of a public duty. Nothing could be more unjust.”
Attorney-General At And By The Relation Of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (Commissioner Of The Federal
Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong, [1967] 2 Malayan L. J. at 73.
129
Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161, § 38(f) (Sing.).
130
Id. § 38(g).
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Liberal Locus Standi Rules May Be Utilized to Allow the Poor to
Access the Courts in the Event of Infringements of the Law

Where relator actions cannot be utilized, the potential applicant would
have to establish locus standi to commence a court action on behalf of the
poor or a group of poor persons. The rationale underlying rules on locus
standi is that judicial resources and time are limited and need to be
appropriately allocated to litigants. Further, the rule seeks to prevent the
opening of floodgates to litigation, particularly frivolous and vexatious
claims.131
The traditional English common law rules of locus standi require: 1)
some interference with a private right of the applicant in conjunction with
the infringement of a public right; or 2) where there is no infringement of a
private right, there must be some special damage suffered by the applicant
arising from the interference with a public right (as encapsulated in the case
of Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council132 and endorsed in Gouriet v.
Union of Post Office Workers133).
This traditional principle was followed by the majority judges in the
Malaysian case of Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang,134 as mentioned
above, to deny locus standi to the applicant, whether as a politician, a road
or highway user, or a tax payer. Hashim Yeop Sani S.C.J., one of the
majority judges, noted there that if there is a lacuna in the law, the
legislature, not the courts, should step in to fill the gaps.135 The Court
reached such a result despite the existence of prior Malaysian decisions136
extolling the liberal approach to locus standi as well as Abdoolcader S.C.J.’s
caution137 against the judiciary taking such retrogressive steps and closing
the door to the ventilation of a public grievance. It is suggested that this
strict approach in Lim Kit Siang should be rejected in favor of the more
liberalized and current approach in England and Singapore.

131
In India, there are explicit judicial pronouncements concerning the need to relax locus standi rules
in order to allow the poor to have a “voice” in court through their proxies. S. P. Gupta v. President of
India, (1982) 69 A.I.R. 149 (India).
132
Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council, (1903) 1 Ch. 109 (U.K.).
133
Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, (1978) A.C. 435 (U.K.).
134
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12, 25, 41.
135
Id. at 41.
136
Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v. Mohamed bin Ismail, [1982] 2 Malayan L. J. 177; Lim Cho Hock v.
Government of the State of Perak, [1980] 2 Malayan L. J. 148.
137
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12, 45.
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In England, it should be observed that the erstwhile Order 53 of the
U.K. Supreme Court Rules,138 which enabled a private citizen to apply for
judicial review on the basis of “a sufficient interest in the matter to which his
application relates,” had already ushered a more liberalized approach to
locus standi.139
In a similar vein, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chan Hiang Leng
Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts140 held that the applicants
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) had locus standi to apply for certiorari as well as a
declaration that the order of the Minister of Information and the Arts
prohibiting certain International Bible Students’ Association publications
was invalid.141 The Court of Appeal held that the applicants had sufficient
interest as citizens of Singapore to challenge the order on the grounds of an
alleged violation of a constitutional provision.142 The Court found that the
fact that a constitutional violation would affect other citizens does not
detract from a citizen’s interest to ensure that his own constitutional rights
are not violated.143 For the applicants to establish sufficient interest in the
matter, the Court determined that the low threshold test of “prima facie case
of reasonable suspicion”144 or an “arguable case”145 that the minister had
acted irrationally would be applicable.
On the other hand, the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in In Re An
Advocate and Solicitor ex parte The Law Society of Singapore for Judicial
Review146 did not involve a constitutional provision but the statutory duty of
the Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”) under the Legal Profession
Act. In that case, the Law Society sought an order of mandamus against the
138
Note that the United Kingdom has revoked Order 53: The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4)
Rules 2000, S.I. 2092 L. 16. The rules for application for judicial review are now contained in Part 54 of
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, S.I. 3132 L. 17. Id.
139
See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Business
Ltd., (1982) A.C. 617 (U.K.).
140
Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609
(Court of Appeal).
141
Id. at 614. However, the Court of Appeal held that the issues raised by the application pertaining
to national security are not justiciable. See id. at 617.
142
Id. at 614; See also SING. CONST. art. 15(1) (conferring the right to profess, practice and propagate
religion).
143
Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609, 614.
144
Id. at 616; see Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin, Linda, [2001] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 644;
Wong Keng Leong Rayner v. Law Society of Singapore, [2006] 4 Sing. L. Rep. 934, ¶ 77; Teng Fuh
Holdings Pte. Ltd. v. Collector of Land Revenue, [2007] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 568, ¶¶ 35, 41 (applying the
holding in the context of an application for leave to apply for order of certiorari and mandamus under Order
53 of the Rules of Court).
145
Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609, 616.
146
In Re An Advocate and Solicitor ex parte The Law Society of Singapore for Judicial Review,
[1987] 2 Malayan L. J. 21.
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disciplinary committee (set up under the provisions of the same Act) to
direct the latter to hear and investigate charges against an advocate and
solicitor.147 The Court of Appeal determined that the Law Society had
“sufficient interest” and therefore the locus standi to apply for the
mandamus as one of the society’s purposes is “to maintain and impose the
standards of conduct . . . of the legal profession in Singapore” under section
39 of the Act.148
Thus, with respect to the legal rights of the poor, the case of Chan
Hiang Leng Colin would support the bringing of an action in the event of an
alleged violation of a constitutional right.149 However, if the group of poor
persons cannot establish a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion or an
arguable case that their constitutional rights have been violated, it would
then be difficult, based on Chan Hiang Leng Colin, to surmount the
procedural obstacle. There is no broad-based constitutional right of access
to justice in Singapore and, more specifically, no constitutional right to legal
aid and legal representation.150 Hence, should a new government decide to
drastically reduce the legal aid budget so as to deprive a substantial number
of the poor of the statutory entitlement to legal aid, these indigent litigants
are unlikely to possess the locus standi to commence the action against the
new government—such individuals would be hard pressed to establish that a
specific constitutional provision, namely the constitutional right to legal aid,
had been violated. Therefore, the procedural principles of locus standi in
Chan Hiang Leng Colin could not be invoked by the group of indigent
litigants claiming entitlement to legal aid where the underlying substratum
of constitutional jurisprudence is absent.
However, the indigent litigants would be able to surmount the locus
standi obstacle if they could establish that “sufficient interest” exists as in In
Re Advocate & Solicitor, notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional
infringement. The courts would not be required to indulge in “a detailed and
microscopic analysis of the [court] material”151 in determining locus standi
as long as there is a prima facie case of suspicion of some infringement of
the law. Again, the indigent litigant seeking criminal legal aid, for example,
may wish to rely on the statutory obligation of the Law Society to “make
provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme whereby impecunious
147

Id. at 22.
Id. at 36 (citing the Legal Profession Act, Ch. 161, § 39 (Sing.)).
149
Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609.
150
See supra Part II.A.
151
See Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin, Linda, [2001] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 644, ¶ 20 (citing
the grounds of decision of the trial judge).
148
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persons on non-capital charges are represented by advocates”152 under the
Legal Profession Act. It is suggested that, where there is prima facie
evidence that the Law Society fails to carry out the statutory functions of
criminal legal aid for the needy, the indigent litigant should have the locus
standi to pursue the matter in the courts. The courts should not curtail such
an application via a strict interpretation of locus standi rules. The
substantive merits of such a case (as to whether a statutory obligation was in
fact breached and whether remedies were available) should be treated as a
separate matter from locus standi.
3.

Representative Actions Can Reduce the Financial Burden for Indigent
Litigants

The Singapore Rules of Court prescribe that representative
proceedings may be commenced where numerous persons have the “same
interest” in the proceedings.153 Such an action is premised upon the
existence of a common interest and common grievance in which the relief
sought is beneficial to the representatives.154 This procedure has been
applied flexibly even to situations where the plaintiff representative does not
have the consent of all the members of the represented group155 or where the
plaintiffs comprise opposing factions.156 The procedural mechanism of
instituting a representative action is not only meant for the poor but
generally for individual prospective litigants who have to shoulder a huge
financial burden in order to litigate. In particular, the mechanism is feasible
where the claims of each prospective litigant are small compared to the
potential costs and risks involved. This financial burden of potential
litigants (including the poor) can be ameliorated if the claims are aggregated
via a representative action. This serves as one avenue for enhancing access
to justice for the group of indigent litigants who may also wish to share the
costs in engaging a lawyer.
In Malaysia, for instance, the representative action was used in the
case of Jok Jau Evong for the protection of native customary proprietary
rights based on a statute.157 The defined representative group in that case
was the Kayan community, a native group that possessed legal rights to the
152

See Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2001 Rev. Ed.), § 38(g).
Order 15, r 12. The leading local decision with respect to representative actions is Tan Chin Seng
v. Raffles Town Club (No 2), [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 302 (involving the suit of 4895 members against the
town club for misrepresentation and breach of contract).
154
See Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, (1901) A.C. 1 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
155
Abdul Rahim v. Ling How Doong, [1994] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 668, 671.
156
Jok Jau Evong v. Marabong Lumber, [1990] 3 Malayan L. J. 427, 433.
157
Id. at 432 (citing the Land Code of Sarawak (Cap. 81)).
153
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customary land.158 In Singapore, though representative actions have been
employed, there has not been a specific case involving indigent litigants as a
group.
4.

The Security for Costs Application by the Defendant Should Not Deny
Access to Justice for the Plaintiff

In Singapore, the defendants involved in court litigation may apply for
security for costs from the plaintiffs pursuant to the Rules of Court based on
specified grounds.159 The impoverishment of the plaintiff is not specifically
stated as a ground for making an order for security for costs.160 However,
one of the specified grounds is that where the plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff,
the court must assess whether there is “reason to believe that [the plaintiff]
will be unable to pay the costs to the defendant if ordered to do so.”161 It
should also be noted that the Rules of Court stipulate that the court making
the order for security for costs is to have regard to “the circumstances of the
case” and considerations of justice.162
Singapore court decisions have expressly noted the significance of
ensuring justice prior to making such an order. For example, the Court is
mindful to ensure that the defendant’s purpose in seeking security for costs
is not to quell the plaintiff’s quest for justice.163 At the same time, the courts
are reluctant to “whittle away a natural person’s right to litigate despite
poverty.”164 Hence, the application for security for costs from the defendant
cannot be seen to deny the plaintiff access to the Singapore courts.165

158

Jok Jau Evong v. Marabong Lumber, [1990] 3 Malayan L. J. 427, 433.
Order 23, r 1 stipulates four alternative grounds: (a) the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside the
jurisdiction; (b) the plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of another person and there is reason
to believe that he will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so; (c) the plaintiff’s
address is not stated in the writ or other originating process or is incorrectly stated therein; or (d) the
plaintiff has changed his address during the course of the proceedings with a view to evading the
consequences of the litigation.
160
See Mathi Alegen s/o Gothendaraman v. The Tamils Representative Council Singapore, [2002]
S.G.H.C. 310, ¶ 21.
161
Order 23, r 1(1)(b).
162
Order 23, r 1.
163
See Pandian Marimuthu v. Guan Leong, [2001] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 400, 403.
164
Amar Hoseen Mohammed v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [1995] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 77, 84 (K.S. Rajah
J.C.).
165
Id.
159
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The Courts Cannot Order Interim Payments by Impecunious
Defendants to Plaintiffs in Personal Injury Actions

Order 29 of the Rules of Court on interim payments166 in Singapore
provides that in an action for personal injuries, the court must not make an
order for interim payments if, amongst other criteria, the defendant does not
have the “means and resources” to make the interim payments.167 This
serves to ameliorate the financial hardship of the indigent defendant.
While no Singapore court has reflected directly on interim payments
by indigent defendants, the English Court of Appeal has interpreted a similar
rule relating to the means and resources of the indigent defendant. In the
English case of British and Commonwealth Holdings v. Quadrex
Holdings,168 the English Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s order
that the defendant pay the plaintiffs interim payments of 75 million pounds
under Order 29. Sir Nicholas Browne Wilkinson V.C. stated that, even in
non-personal injury cases, “ . . . if a defendant's resources are such that an
order for interim payment would cause irremediable harm which cannot be
made good by an eventual repayment, that is a very relevant factor to be
taken into account in fixing the amount of any interim payment.”169 Hence,
the Court of Appeal in that case drastically reduced the interim payment sum
payable by the defendants.170
6.

Streamlining the Litigation Processes and Judicial Case Management
to Enhance Efficiency Should Not Compromise Substantive Access to
Justice

The modus operandi of the Singapore courts is to reduce litigation
costs and the waiting time for litigants as discussed below. In this way,
indigent litigants who are not eligible for legal aid would likely benefit from
the greater efficiencies of court processes. As more well-off litigants are
likely better able to withstand prolonged trials or hearings as compared to
their indigent counterparts, efficient court processes serve to reduce the
166
Order 29, r 9 of the Rules of Court provides that interim payments, in relation to a defendant,
means a payment on account of any damages, debt or other sum (excluding costs) which he may be held
liable to pay to or for the benefit of the plaintiff. Order 29, r 10 empowers the plaintiff to apply to the
Court for an order requiring that the defendant make an interim payment.
167
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 29, r. 11(2)(b).
168
British and Commonwealth Holdings v. Quadrex Holdings, (1989) Q.B. 842 (U.K.).
169
Id. at 867.
170
Id. Note that the current U.K. Civil Procedures Rules 1998 (No. 3132 L. 17) do not stipulate the
above-mentioned criterion relating to the “means and resources” of the defendant to make the interim
payment, unlike the Rules of Court applicable to Singapore.
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inequality gap. The improved efficiency of courts through more streamlined
procedures and case management, ceteris paribus, is likely to reduce
economic costs for the litigants as a whole, not to mention the anxiety and
worries that can arise from undue delays in the judicial process. In criminal
cases, inefficiency can further translate into loss of liberty if the accused is
kept in remand for an unnecessarily long period pending trial. In addition,
where a long time-lag exists between the events which give rise to the court
action and the trial, there is a greater tendency for errors to multiply.
However, although speed and efficiency of the court processes are
important, they should not be over-emphasized such that the capacity of
lawyers and litigants in person to understand and adequately prepare for
their cases is compromised.
One important measure undertaken by the Singapore judiciary is the
streamlining of litigation processes to facilitate access to justice. Prior to the
reforms of the 1990s, the pace of litigation was virtually dictated by the
parties, rather than the courts.171 As an important feature of the departure
from the party-controlled litigation process, Singapore introduced the
proactive, court-initiated and court-directed procedure pursuant to Order
34A of the Rules of Court for “just, expeditious and economical disposal” in
the Subordinate Courts in 1994172 and the High Court in 1996
respectively.173 This judicial formula for efficiency is also applied to the
stage of summons for directions in trial preparation.174 In addition, since
2001, the rule of automatic discontinuance was applied to cases that have
been inactive for the duration of the preceding twelve months.175
With respect to manpower management in criminal cases, Singapore
reduced the number of judges in capital trials from two to one since April
1992 in order to double the rate of disposal of cases and thus significantly
shortened the remand period before trial.176 Another measure involved the
transferring of cases from the High Court judge to the registrars in
bankruptcy petitions, family law disputes, and proceedings of the
quasi-judicial tribunals such as the Copyright Tribunal, the Tenants’
171

See PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 94.
Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Rules 1994 (S260/94).
173
Rules of Court 1996 (S71/96) (Sing.) (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
174
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 25, r. 1(b).
175
See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Speech at the 12th Conference
of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific: Overcoming Backlogs, ¶ 58 (June 4, 2007) (transcript available at
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/2022/HK%20Conference%20_CJ%20speech.pdf)
[hereinafter Overcoming Backlogs].
176
See Singapore Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT SINGAPORE: THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE
1990S 48 (1994).
172
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Compensation Board, and the Income Tax Board of Review.177 Furthermore,
the recent enactment of the Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act in 2005178
allows greater flexibility in transferring cases from the Subordinate Courts to
the High Court and vice versa to improve efficiency.
The Singapore judiciary also simplified the litigation processes.179
The Rules of the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts were merged to
form a single set of rules in 1996.180 In addition, recent changes have been
implemented to streamline processes by reducing the four modes of
commencement of proceedings to two (namely, the writ of summons and
originating summons)181 and by simplifying certain Latin or archaic legal
terms previously in use.182
Further, with respect to streamlining the litigation process in terms of
targeting outcomes and monitoring, the Singapore Supreme Court has
cleared an extensive backlog of cases since the 1990s.183 Waiting periods for
cases to be heard are now considerably shorter than in the past.184 Indeed,
these specific waiting periods are not merely part of a wish list but are
“concretized” in the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006.185 Now in
Singapore, the speed at which the cases are heard and disposed of is fairly
phenomenal. In 2005, the average disposal time for writs was less than
seven months with more than 50% of the writs filed concluded in less than
six months.186 The Singapore judiciary has continued to set lofty standards
and targets for the disposal of cases.187
177
178

Id. at 44.
Subordinate Courts Act, ch. 321 (Act 26 of 2005 – Subordinate Courts Act (Amendment) Act 26)

(Sing.).
179
See The Honourable Yong Pung How, Chief Justice of Singapore, Chief Justice Yong Pung
How’s Speech, Opening of the Legal Year 2006 (Jan. 7, 2006), ¶¶ 5, 6 (transcript available at
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=921) [hereinafter Chief Justice’s Speech 2006].
180
The Rules of Court 1996 went into effect on April 1, 1996. At the same time, the Rules of the
Subordinate Courts (1993 Edition) and the Rules of the Supreme Court (1990 Edition) were repealed. See
Rules of Court 1996 (S71/96) (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
181
See Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act 2005; Rules of Court (Amendment No. 3)
Rules; see also The Supreme Court Practice Directions (Practice Direction No. 12 of 2005) and the
Registrar’s Circulars No. 5 of 2005, http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=98.
182
The following legal terms have been substituted by new terms contained in parentheses:
mandamus (mandatory order); prohibition (prohibiting order); certiorari (quashing order) and habeas
corpus (order for review of detention). See Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act 2005 (Act
42 of 2005) (adding a new section 41B to the Interpretation Act (Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed.)).
183
See Chief Justice, Singapore Supreme Court, Response By The Honourable The Chief Justice:
Opening of the Legal Year 1999 (Jan. 9, 1999), ¶¶ 5-7, 37, 38 (transcript available at
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=538).
184
See CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 98.
185
See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), app. B.
186
See Chief Justice’s Speech 2006, supra note 179, ¶ 20.
187
The targets comprise the disposal of at least 85% of the writ actions within eighteen months of
filing and the fixing of trial dates within eight weeks of setting down. See The Honourable Chan Sek
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Aiding in the efficient disposal of cases, the Differentiated Case
Management Scheme of the Singapore judiciary assigns cases to different
management tracks (standard, express, and complex).188 Each track has a
different timeline for disposing of cases and the progress of the cases is
subject to regular monitoring.189 There is also a differentiated track for
complex civil claims above S$150,000 at the Subordinate Courts.190 The
group management scheme in the Subordinate Courts ensures that the group
managers (district judges) are each responsible for distributing and
monitoring the cases heard by the other judges within their group.191
Despite the Singapore judiciary’s progress in this arena, it is important
to note that over-efficiency of the judicial system may put great demands on
the time and resources of law firms and lawyers,192 potentially affecting the
quality of legal services provided.193 This also applies to litigants in person
in the preparation of the case, discussed more fully in Part II.C below. It is
important that the speed and efficiency of the litigation process should not
supplant substantive justice.194 To reiterate the words of Justice Andrew
Phang (cited above): “The quest for justice, therefore, entails a continuous
need to balance the procedural with the substantive. More than that, it is a
continuous attempt to ensure that both are integrated, as far as that is
humanly possible. Both interact with each other.”195 In this regard, the
adversarial process has an important role to play in ensuring that all material
evidence, facts and legal arguments are put before the judges concerned. If
lawyers and litigants encounter problems in ensuring adequate preparation

Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Response By The Honourable The Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong:
Opening of the Legal Year 2007 (Jan. 6, 2007) ¶¶ 3-5 (transcript available at
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=67) [hereinafter Response by Chief Justice Chan 2007].
188
See Abigail Ng & Eric Tin, Leading Change in the Singapore’s Magistracy: The Seven Working
Precepts (unpublished paper presented at the inaugural AIJA Magistrates’ Conference, Melbourne, July 2021, 2001), ¶ 12, available at http://www.aija.org.au/Mag01/Singapore.pdf.
189
See Waleed Haider Malik, JUDICIARY-LED REFORMS IN SINGAPORE: FRAMEWORK, STRATEGIES,
AND LESSONS 76 (The World Bank, 2007).
190
See SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 49, at 5-6.
191
Mavis Chionh, The Development of the Court System, in ESSAYS IN SINGAPORE LEGAL HISTORY
118 (Kevin Y. L. Tan ed., 2005).
192
The pace of litigation ranked fifth (out of twelve categories, the last being the residual category of
“Others”) in terms of the reasons for lawyers who ceased practice in Singapore from 1999 to 2001.
CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 154, 185.
193
One senior lawyer was quoted as stating, “Justice delayed may be justice denied. But justice
hurried is justice buried. You can’t expect cuisine quality under fast food conditions . . . .” Ong Soh Chin,
Singapore Lawyers – Up Close With ‘A Most Naughty Profession’, STRAITS TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006.
194
See CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 141.
195
United Overseas Bank Limited v. Ng Huat Foundations Pte. Ltd., [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 425, ¶ 8.
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for hearings,196 there is a danger that the judge (and, for that matter, justice)
may be compromised due to the absence of proper evidence and legal
arguments. This important issue was emphatically addressed by the present
Chief Justice who stated recently that “[n]o litigant should be allowed to
leave the courtroom with the conviction or feeling that he has not been given
a fair hearing.”197 Indeed, in the most recent Subordinate Courts Workplan,
the Chief Justice has highlighted the need to broaden and deepen the
development of the “law, practice and jurisprudence” of Singapore.198
From the perspective of this second procedural approach, the
prognosis is generally positive in Singapore. While relator actions are not
practical to vindicate the rights of the poor to access justice, locus standi
rules are sufficiently liberal in Singapore, even in the absence of a
constitutional right of access to justice. Representative actions may be used
to reduce legal costs for each indigent litigant by pooling resources. With
respect to applications for security for costs, there have been several positive
statements by judges emphasizing the significance of access to justice in
determining the outcomes of such applications. Indigent defendants may
also be protected via court orders refusing to grant interim payments to
plaintiffs. While procedural efficiencies of the judicial processes have
reduced costs and delays for litigants as a whole, care must be taken not to
allow such efficiency to supplant substantive justice for individual litigants.
C.

Institutional Measures Have, to a Large Extent, Enhanced Access to
Justice for the Poor

The institutional (or organizational) approach examines fairly
large-scale reforms of the Singapore judicial system in recent years. These
reforms may involve economic measures as well as the types of procedural
measures discussed in Parts II.A and II.B above. Indeed, the three
approaches interact and overlap to a considerable extent. In this Section, the
work of small claims tribunals, court technology, court mediations as well as
196
It was reported that a survey of more than 100 law firms revealed that 70% of them faced
problems preparing for civil court hearings that were brought forward. See Blochlinger, supra note 48, at
613 (citing Tan Ooi Boon, Early Trial Dates “Not a Problem,” STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999).
197
See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Keynote Address: Justice @
The Subordinate Courts: The New Phases of Justice, 15th Subordinate Courts Workplan 2006/2007, ¶ 27
(May 18, 2006), available at http://app.subcourts.gov.sg//subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=34949 (last visited
Sept. 3, 2007).
198
See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Keynote Address: Justice @
The Subordinate Courts: The Next Phase, 16th Subordinate Courts Workplan 2007/2008, ¶ 5 (Apr. 27,
2007), (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=2021) [hereinafter
Keynote Address 2007].
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legal aid provision, pro bono work, and the judicial perspectives towards
litigants in person will be discussed.
1.

Small Claims Tribunals Provide Cost-Effective Access to the Courts

The aim of the Small Claims Tribunals Act199 was to reduce costs and
delays in Singapore and to that end, enhance access to justice for litigants
with limited means. In this respect, the fees for lodging a claim at the Small
Claims Tribunals (“SCTs”) are maintained at a relatively low level.200
Further, the lodging of claims via the use of electronic forms can be
accomplished expeditiously at SCTs.201 In fact, the Honorable Chief Justice
has indicated that, in the near future, the enforcement of SCT orders,
currently enforceable as Magistrates’ orders, will be even further
simplified.202
With respect to possible criticism that the potential for SCTs in
enhancing access to justice for the poor litigant is limited by the jurisdiction
stated in the SCT legislation, the fact is that since SCTs were first
established, the cause of action jurisdiction has been increased. Initially, the
SCTs had jurisdiction over claims such as disputes with respect to the sale of
goods and provision of services.203 Subsequently, tort claims resulting in
property damage (excluding those arising from motor accidents)204 and more
recently, claims relating to disputes arising from any contract for the lease of
residential premises not exceeding two years, were added to the list.205 The
monetary limits on the jurisdiction of the SCTs have also increased
199
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.) (This Act was most recently
amended in 2005), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then
follow the “Small Claims Tribunals Act” hyperlink).
200
The fee is S$10 for claim amounts up to S$5000, S$20 for claim amounts beyond S$5000 but
below S$10,000. Where the claim is beyond S$10,000 but not exceeding S$20,000, the lodgment fee is 1%
of the claim amount. See The Singapore Subordinate Courts, SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORT:
THE
NEW
PHASES
OF
JUSTICE
42-43
(2006),
available
at
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4469 [hereafter SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL
REPORT 2006].
201
This is in the form of a downloadable do-it-yourself kit for court users. See Subordinate Courts of
Singapore, Our Do-It-Yourself Kit, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/sct/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
202
SCT orders are currently enforced as Magistrates’ Orders which are more onerous. See Keynote
Address 2007, supra note 198, ¶ 35.
203
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984) (Sing.)
The original enactment of this Act was in 1984.
204
Small Claims Tribunals, ch. 308 (Act 17 of 1995 - Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Act
1995) (Sing.). The 1995 amendments were the second revisions to the Act following its original
enactment.
205
Small Claims Tribunals, ch. 308 (Act 43 of 2005 - Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Act
2005) (Sing.). The 2005 amendments are the most recent revisions to the Act and came into operation on
February 15, 2006.
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significantly in Singapore since the SCTs’ establishment in 1984, from a
mere S$2000206 to S$10,000 (and where parties consent, up to a maximum
amount of S$20,000).207 Such expansion of the SCTs’ jurisdiction enables
greater use of these tribunals as a cheaper and more user-friendly alternative
forum to the civil courts.
As part of the Singapore judiciary’s initiatives to enhance access to
justice for the poor, in order to reduce the financial risks borne by litigants,
SCTs are not allowed to award costs to the victorious party, only
disbursements.208 Moreover, once a claim has been lodged with SCTs, the
plaintiff is generally foreclosed from bringing an action in the civil courts,209
where the costs are likely to be higher.
One significant feature of SCTs is that no legal representation is
allowed.210 Whether the absence of legal representation might work to the
relative detriment of the poor as against more well-off litigants depends, to a
large extent, on the referee hearing the case. In particular, it depends on
whether the referee would be proactive in ensuring that an indigent litigant is
not unfairly prejudiced in a hearing against, for example, a large corporate
body. According to a 1999 public survey, 98% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that SCTs provide a low-cost forum for resolving small
claims.211 Notwithstanding such public sentiment, the Singapore judiciary
continues to implement measures seeking to “equalize” this apparent
asymmetry in litigation resources between litigants. For instance, the
Subordinate Courts have recently provided user-friendly do-it-yourself
(“DIY”) kits on the process of SCTs to guide litigants through the judicial
process.212 To encourage public discourse on the subject, the Subordinate
Courts also organized public talks on the work of the SCTs.213
The informal setting of a SCT proceeding is likely, as a whole, to
promote greater access to justice for indigent litigants. The SCT processes
enable the amicable settlement of disputes before the referee hears the

206
207
208

Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984) (Sing.).
Small Claims Tribunals (Jurisdiction) Order (1997) (S. 321/97).
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 31 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984)

(Sing.).
209

Id. § 6.
Id. § 23(3).
211
See Survey On Public Attitudes and Perceptions of the Singapore Subordinate Courts, 23 RES.
BULL. 5 (Subordinate Courts of Singapore), Dec. 1999, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/
Research/rb23.pdf [hereinafter Survey on Public Attitudes and Perceptions 1999].
212
See Subordinate Courts of Singapore, DIY Kit, available at http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/
sct/page.aspx?pageid=3946 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
213
See SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORTS 2006, supra note 200, at 43.
210
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evidence and decides the case based on its merits.214 Also relevant, the
referee in a SCT proceeding is not required to resort to strict legal forms,
technicalities, or rules of evidence.215 Bearing in mind that specific studies
conducted appeared to show a general positive correlation between the level
of education, income, and wealth in Singapore,216 this absence of the
requirement for formality and technical rules would, ceteris paribus,
presumably enable poorer litigants without legal representation greater (or
more equal) access to justice at SCTs.
In the initial years of establishing SCTs, the main users were corporate
bodies to collect debts for unpaid goods and services.217 The jurisdiction of
the SCTs explicitly included claims in respect of fees and levies owed to
certain statutory bodies.218 One commentator expressed concern that
consumers as a group might be sidelined and proposed a limitation on the
number of claims filed by corporate bodies.219 However, as noted by
another commentator, the use of SCTs by corporate bodies for debt
collection does not necessarily hinder access to justice for individual
litigants (including the financially strapped) as long as the caseload is
properly managed by SCTs.220
One of the possible criticisms of the SCTs’ process that might bear on
access to justice for the poor is that appeal rights for litigants are restricted.
A right to appeal against the referee’s decision to a higher court is not
automatic.221 It exists only where there is a question of law or if the dispute
is beyond the jurisdiction of the SCTs.222 In addition, the leave of the district
court is required before an appeal may be taken.223 This current restriction
on the right of appeal is arguably in line with the aim of reducing litigation
costs, namely, “to promote finality, and to avoid high costs in appealing that
214
However, the referee would not have the benefit of professionally prepared legal arguments and
research of counsel.
215
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 22 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Small Claims
Tribunals Act” hyperlink).
216
See Ng & Yap, supra note 24; see also CReST Paper, supra note 25, at 2, 8-9.
217
See Louis D’Souza, An Experiment in Informal Justice: The Small Claims Tribunal of Singapore,
3 SING. ACAD. L. J. 264, 274 (1991).
218
Town Councils Act, ch. 329A, §§ 24H, 51 (2000 Rev. Ed.) (conservancy and service charges
owing by owner or tenant of flat to Town Council); Housing and Development Act, ch. 129, § 65I(b) (2004
Rev. Ed.).
219
Ho Peng Kee, Small Claims Process: Some Reflections, 26 Malayan L. R. 17, 26-27 (1984).
220
Soh Kee Bun, Small Claims Jurisdiction, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 389, 392 (1996).
221
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 38 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Small Claims
Tribunals Act” hyperlink).
222
Id.
223
Id.
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may exceed in fact the sums in dispute . . . .”224 A blanket right to appeal
from the decisions of the referee at SCTs could result in increased costs,
which the poor litigant can ill-afford.
Apart from SCTs, there are other avenues for resolving small claims
which are relevant to the promotion of access to justice. One recent
initiative has been the introduction of a new Expedited Claims Track for
claims below S$20,000.225 These comprise debt claims, non-injury motor
accident claims and claims for damages by victims of crime after the
accused has been convicted.226 The Honourable Chief Justice envisaged
that, in the near future, non-injury motor accident cases below S$1000 will
be first heard by the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre Ltd.,
before the commencement of proceedings at the Subordinate Courts.227 The
objective is to provide a “quick and affordable avenue for consumers who do
not have the resources to go to court or who do not want to incur legal fees”
and where no legal representation is allowed.228
2.

The Use of Technology in the Courts Has, to a Large Extent, Improved
Access to Justice for the Poor

To combat the problem of the poor suffering from “poverty of
information,”229 the courts have undertaken programs to promote legal
literacy and training for members of the public through the use of
technology. The advent of the internet enabled the dissemination of useful
information about court services to the public. In this regard, the Singapore
judiciary has utilized technology for public education purposes. The
Subordinate Courts' e@dr website, for instance, provides public information
on the appropriate dispute resolution forum, legal aid, and free services by
the courts and volunteers.230 Websites of various subordinate courts, such as
the family court231 and the juvenile court,232 also provide public access to
case law and law articles. More recently, the newly released court
224

80 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES REPORT, col. 1829 (Nov. 21, 2005).
See Keynote Address 2007, supra note 198, ¶ 26.
226
See id.
227
Id. ¶ 32.
228
Id. ¶ 33.
229
Mauro Cappelletti, Access to Justice as a Theoretical Approach to Law and a Practical
Programme for Reform, 109 S. AFR. L. J. 22, 29 (1992).
230
See Singapore Subordinate Courts, eAlternative Dispute Resolution, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/eadr/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
231
See Singapore Subordinate Courts, Family Justice Division, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/
index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
232
See Singapore Subordinate Courts, Juvenile Justice Division, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/juvenile/
index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
225
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judgments have been posted on the websites of the Subordinate Courts233
and Supreme Court234 for easy public access. The Chief Justice has also
announced that the Multi-Door Courthouse Justice Connect Information
Centre will eventually assist litigants in person with court-related
information.235
A substantial majority of Singaporeans have access to the internet at
home, and the level of internet access is increasing.236 Although some
disparity exists in access to technology between high and low-income
groups,237 a large percentage of the low-income group is nevertheless able to
access the internet and thus court-related information online.238
Within the Singapore judiciary, the various forms of technology such
as videolink, computer-aided presentations, web-based filing for small
claims tribunals and the electronic filing of court documents have been
utilized to enhance efficiency in the courts.239 Recently, a pilot project
known as “E-PTC,” which allows pre-trial conferences to be conducted by
email, was launched.240 The Applications and Cases E-Management System
is being planned to allow for electronic monitoring of cases against the
timelines set by the courts.241 When implemented, this is expected to
obviate the necessity of conducting pre-trial conferences if the parties have
already complied with the stipulated timelines.242
The relationship between the use of technology and access to justice
for the poor in Singapore raises the issue of whether computer-aided
presentations privilege the well-off at the expense of the indigent litigant.
First, it may be argued that computer aids are not evidence per se but merely
serve as explanatory tools of the evidence adduced. Further, judges, as both
triers of law and fact, should be capable of assessing the prejudicial effect of
the material presented and disallow such materials if necessary.243 As an
additional safeguard, the person who prepared the demonstrative evidence
233

See Subordinate Courts of Singapore, http://www.subcourts.gov.sg/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
See Supreme Court of Singapore, http://www.supcourt.gov.sg/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
235
See Keynote Address 2007, supra note 198, ¶ 46.
236
See Lee Meng Chung, Infocomm Usage by Households and Individuals 2000-2005, STAT. SING.
NEWSL., Mar. 2006, at 17, available at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/ssn/archive/ssnmar2006.pdf.
237
See INFOCOMM DEV. AUTHORITY OF SING., ANNUAL SURVEY ON INFOCOMM USAGE IN
HOUSEHOLDS AND BY INDIVIDUALS FOR 2006, at 8, 12 (2007), available at
http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/Publications/Publications_Level2/20061205092557/hh06_public_v4.4.pdf.
238
See Ng & Yap, supra note 24.
239
See
Supreme
Court
of
Singapore:
Technology,
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=361 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
240
See Response by Chief Justice Chan 2007, supra note 187.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Evidence Act, ch. 97, § 68(A) (1997) (Sing.).
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may be called to testify and be available for cross-examination as to the
accuracy of the material.244 In this regard, there are sufficient safeguards to
ensure that the greater affordability of and accessibility to computer aids in
the courtroom for the well-off would not unfairly prejudice litigants with
limited means.
It should, however, be observed that the use of technology in the
courts comes at a cost to litigants. The Electronic Filing System (“EFS”),
initiated in 1997, enables the electronic filing and service of court
documents245 from the offices of law firms as well as the speedy transfer of
files and electronic research. According to the Census of the Legal Industry
and Profession, a majority of the lawyers and law firms surveyed in 2000
indicated that the EFS had in fact increased the overall costs to prepare and
file court documents.246 Further, pursuant to the Rules of Court, fees must
be paid for the use of a technology court, its facilities, and the use and
preparation of the computer presentation system.247 The Supreme Court
Practice Directions 2006 also stipulated fees for the use of specific court
technology.248
Notwithstanding the above, the EFS is unlikely to prejudice the
indigent litigant. This is because efforts have been undertaken by the
Singapore Judiciary to reduce or waive fees for the use of technology. With
respect to filing of court documents via EFS, indigent litigants can apply for
the waiver or deferral249 of EFS fees and charges.250 EFS is in the process of
transitioning into the Electronic Litigation Systems (“ELS”), which seeks to
integrate the use of technology in the litigation process.251 Although the
focus of the ELS is to facilitate the disposal of cases via the use of
technology, the EFS Review Implementation Committee, established in
August 2003, recognized that for litigants in person, ELS should
244

See Richard Magnus, The Confluence of Law and Policy in Leveraging Technology: Singapore
Judiciary’s Experience, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 670 (2004).
245
See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 63(A)(2).
246
The majority constituted 62% of the respondents surveyed; only 9% indicated a decrease in overall
costs while 29% felt EFS had minimal impact on overall costs. See CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 5.
247
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 91(2).
248
The fees for each day of use are as follows: Technology Court (S$50), video-conferencing
equipment installed in a technology court (S$1000), Mobile Info-Technology Trolley (S$100) and videoconferencing equipment from the mobile Info-Technology Trolley as well as telecommunication charges
(actual cost) thereof. See Supreme Court Practice Directions, app. D(1-5) (2007).
249
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 91(5).
250
See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), app. B, ¶ 71(E)-(G); Rules of Court, 2006, R.5,
Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 91(5).
251
See generally SING. ACAD. OF LAW, ELECTRONIC LITIGATION IN SINGAPORE: A ROADMAP FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE LITIGATION PROCESS (May 2005), available at
http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/LawNet%20Papers/Attachments/1/Electronic%20Litigation%20R
oadmap%20Paper.pdf.
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nevertheless allow filing of paper documents.252 In this regard, it added that
the service bureau can provide services to litigants in person for a
“reasonable fee.”253
3.

Court-Based Mediation as an Alternative to Costly Litigation and the
Problem of Unequal Bargaining Power of Disputants

The aims of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) movement
in Singapore are generally to improve efficiency and reduce costs in the
litigation processes as well as to promote less confrontational methods to
dispute resolution.254 Former Chief Justice Yong warned of the “intolerable”
costs of dispute resolution and observed that ADR should help litigants to
“resolve their conflicts fairly, at an affordable cost, and with due
dispatch.”255 The purpose of ADR is not to enhance access to justice for the
poor alone, though the poor would be beneficiaries if the ADR mechanisms
are implemented properly.
This Section focuses on one significant aspect of ADR, namely courtbased mediation. For the purposes of this Article, the term “court-based
mediation” refers to mediation that takes places in the courts after court
proceedings have been initiated but before the matter proceeds to trial.256
The mediation process serves as an alternative to full-fledged litigation that
may be costly and time-consuming,257 with the concomitant positive effects
of access to justice for poorer litigants.
Court-based mediation is a significant feature of the Singapore
judicial landscape. The e@dr Centre258 of the Subordinate Courts supervises
the use of mediation in civil cases. The Settlement Conference is presided
252

Id. ¶ 9.3.1.
Id.
254
See Cappelletti, supra note 229, at 34 (referring to these alternatives to ordinary, contentious
litigation as “coexistential justice”).
255
See Chief Justice Yong Pung How, Supreme Court of Singapore, Address at the Official Opening
of the Singapore Mediation Centre (Aug. 16, 1997), http://www.mediation.com.sg/speech_1.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2008) (emphasis added).
256
Court-based mediation, as defined, excludes referrals by the courts to mediation conducted by
bodies or institutions outside of the Singapore judiciary. For example, in criminal cases, a Magistrate of
the Subordinate Courts is empowered to refer a private complaint to a mediator of the Community
Mediation Centers for mediation. Community Mediation Centers Act, ch. 49(A), § 15 (1998). This is not
court-based mediation for purposes of this Article. Court-based mediation also excludes mediation
provided by government agencies and tribunals outside the Singapore Judiciary such as the Tribunal for the
Maintenance of Parents. Maintenance of Parents Act, ch. 167(B), § 5(6) (1996).
257
LIM LAN YUAN & LIEW THIAM LENG, COURT MEDIATION IN SINGAPORE 50 (1997).
258
The e@dr Centre was formerly known as the Court Mediation Centre when it first began in 1994
and was renamed as the Primary Dispute Resolution Centre in 1998. It was subsequently renamed as the
e@dr Centre in 2000. See Lock Han Chng Jonathan v. Goh Jessiline, [2007] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 51, ¶ 16.
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over by a settlement judge who is expected to take a proactive mediation
role in examining and suggesting possible solutions to the parties.259 The
family court, which is statutorily empowered to refer disputing parties, with
their consent, to mediation,260 provides in-house mediation and counseling
services free of charge. One of the factors used by the family court in
determining whether a case should proceed for maintenance mediation is the
need to save litigation costs.261 The recently-established Family Relations
Centre of the family court has achieved a high rate of successfully mediated
cases.262 In addition, the Registrar of the small claims tribunals is obliged to
invite disputing parties for consultation “with a view to effecting a
settlement acceptable to all the parties.”263
For purposes of this Article, a relevant consideration is whether
court-based mediation removes or reduces the inequality of resources of two
litigants. First, mediation provides a less costly and faster method of
resolving disputes.264 Litigants are not charged hearing fees by the court for
settlement conferences.265 As noted above, the family court in-house
mediation is free of charge. Second, mediation provides an informal and
flexible process which is relatively more conducive for the litigant in person
as compared to the traditional adversarial process. For litigants with legal
representation, the courts’ practice is to require lawyers to inform and advise
clients of the option of using mediation.266 Notably, the settlement rate for
civil cases commenced in the Subordinate Courts has been extremely
high.267

259
See
Subordinate
Courts
of
Singapore:
Court
Dispute
Resolution,
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4419 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
260
See Women’s Charter, ch. 353, § 50(1) (1997).
261
Marvin Bay, Shobha G. Nair & Asanthi Mendis, The Integration of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Within the Subordinate Courts’ Adjudication Process, 16 SING. ACAD. L. J. 501, 503 (2004).
262
See Overcoming Backlogs, supra note 175, ¶ 64 (noting that 88% of the 1150 mediated cases at
the Family Relations Centre reached settlement in 2006).
263
Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 17(1) (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Small Claims
Tribunal Act” hyperlink).
264
See 79 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS: ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE FOR THE FINANCIAL
YEAR 1ST APRIL 2005 TO 31ST MARCH 2006, col. 1314 (Mar. 3, 2005).
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See Subordinate Courts of Singapore: Court Dispute Resolution International (CDRI),
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/civil/faqs_print.aspx?pageid=8170 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
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See SUBORDINATE COURTS PRACTICE DIRECTIONS, at 64-65, (2006 ed.), available at
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/PracticeDirections/Master%20PD.pdf.
267
See 79 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS: ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE FOR THE FINANCIAL
YEAR 1ST APRIL 2005 TO 31ST MARCH 2006, col. 1314 (Mar. 3, 2005) (stating that between 1994 and 2004,
some 48,300 civil matters in the Subordinate Courts were mediated with an average settlement rate of over
94%).
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However, difficulties arise with respect to litigants of markedly
different bargaining power. Professor Fiss of Yale Law School cautions
about the informational asymmetry of the economically poor, this group’s
greater inducement to settle to obtain payments, and its lack of resources to
finance litigation which can adversely skew the settlement outcome.268
Another commentator noted that mediation is generally not suitable in a case
of great power inequality, as the stronger party lacks the incentive to
compromise.269 It is also plausible for inequity in financial power to be
manifested in other forms, which can skew the settlement process, such as
inequalities in literacy level and education. The above does not mean that it
is impossible to find a mediated resolution between parties with vast
disparities in financial prowess, but it does suggest that it might be more
difficult to achieve appropriate mediated solutions.
Even in a case where there is no chasm in the parties’ relative power,
there are potential problems in ensuring that the parties’ settlement have
been reached voluntarily and based on the proper evidence and facts.
Although control mechanisms within the judicial process guard against
coercion of parties by the judge to settle without first hearing the evidence,
as occurred in the English Court of Appeal decision of Re R (A Minor),270
this ultimately depends on whether litigants, particularly those who are not
legally represented, are aware that the judicial conduct in question was
improper.
Apart from questions about the effectiveness of court-based mediation
for vulnerable parties (including those with limited means), the legal status
of orders emanating from settlements brokered by a judge-mediator may
also be uncertain. Such questions arose recently in relation to the status of
the court orders of the settlement judges at the e@dr Centre. In Lock Han
Chng Jonathan v. Goh Jessiline,271 the Singapore High Court determined
that the e@dr Centre was not a Subordinate Court vested with judicial power
and instead was merely part of the organization of the Subordinate Courts.272
268

See Richard L. Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice, Volume 1: The American Experience, cited
in DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 56, 58 (Michael Palmer &
Simon Roberts eds., 2005).
269
See LIM LAN YUAN & LIEW THIAM LENG, supra note 257, at 62.
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Re R, (A Minor) (1995) 1 W.L.R. 184, 191 (A.C.) (U.K.) (determining that a previous consent
order, arrived at by the parties (who were legally represented) after a settlement, should be set aside and
ordering a retrial). The decision cautioned that “great care must be taken not to exert improper or undue
pressure on a party to settle when he or she is unwilling to do so. In particular, the judge must take great
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upon it finally and for all time.” Id.
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Thus, the Centre does not possess the requisite jurisdiction to make orders of
court.273 According to the decision, the settlement judge at the e@dr Centre
is only entitled to record the settlement reached by parties and, as such, the
parties must appear before a judicial officer of the Subordinate Courts to
convert the recorded settlement into a court order.274 Consistent with the
High Court decision, the Subordinate Courts issued a circular in May 2007
to effect the procedure for the recording of consent judgments or orders.275
However, the Singapore Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the High
Court decision in October 2007 and stated that the Centre has the power to
make court orders.276 Detailed grounds of the decision are still pending from
the Court of Appeal, but the Subordinate Courts have already revoked the
above-mentioned circular.277 Although the wheel seems to have turned a full
circle, this episode has, subject to further clarification from the Court of
Appeal, raised some doubts about the legal status of the orders arising from
settlements made at the Subordinate Courts.
4.

The Singapore Judiciary Assists in Extending and Promoting the
Provision of Legal Aid and Pro Bono Services and Takes Steps to
Enhance Access to Justice for Litigants in Person

This Section examines the work of government organs, private
organizations and the judiciary in providing legal aid to litigants with limited
means. Insofar as legal aid refers to the provision of legal assistance and
advice by lawyers, it is expected that the bulk of the legal aid burden would
fall on the shoulders of the state legal aid bodies and/or private lawyers, not
judges. Judges, by virtue of their role as impartial arbiters and bearing in
mind the potential perils arising from real or perceived conflicts of interests,
are not expected to provide direct legal advice and assistance to litigants,
particularly in an adversarial litigation system such as Singapore’s.
However, the judiciary can play a more indirect role in legal aid provision,
pro bono work, and in providing assistance to litigants. The Singapore
judiciary has taken positive steps in this regard but more can be done to
enhance access to justice for litigants.
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Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 28.
275
See SUBORDINATE COURTS, REGISTRAR’S CIRCULAR, No. 1 (2007).
276
See Wong Mun Wai, Teacher Wins Appeal Against Insurer Over Legal Costs, CHANNEL
NEWSASIA, Oct. 3, 2007, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/
view/303590/1/.html.
277
See SUBORDINATE COURTS, REGISTRAR’S CIRCULAR, No. 2 (2007).
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The Singapore Judiciary’s Roles in the Extension of Legal Aid and
Promotion of Pro Bono Work

State legal aid in civil cases is managed by the Legal Aid Bureau
(“LAB”).278 LAB conducts a means test as well as a merits test to determine
eligibility. The means test is based on the disposable capital and income
level of the applicant.279 The merits test is based on the opinion of the LAB
(consisting of the Director of LAB and at least two private practitioners)
whether the applicant has “reasonable grounds” for taking or defending the
action.280 The Director possesses wide discretion to refuse granting legal
aid.281 Legal aid work is carried out by legal officers of LAB or by private
lawyers assigned by the Director of LAB at rates below normal legal
costs.282 Outside of the state civil legal aid system, the Law Society283 and

278
See Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch.160 (1996); see also Legal Aid Bureau, About Us,
http://app.minlaw.gov.sg/lab/about.asp (last visited May 17, 2008).
279
See id. § 8(2); see also Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, Second Schedule, ¶ 1 [hereinafter
Second Schedule]. The current threshold amounts are S$10,000 (disposable capital) and S$10,000
(disposable income) per annum. See Second Schedule, supra, ¶ 1. Where the applicant has disposable
income in excess of S$2000 per annum and disposable capital in excess of S$2000, the Director may
require the applicant to make contributions to the Legal Aid Fund pursuant to section 9(1) of the Legal Aid
and Advice Act. See id. ¶ 3. “Disposable capital” refers to the property that the applicant for legal aid
possesses or is entitled to minus the subject matter of the proceedings, his wearing apparel, tools of the
trade, household furniture, his dwelling-house or Housing and Development Board home, savings of up to
S$30,000 if he is aged 60 years and above, and his monies in the Central Provident Fund (“CPF”). Id. ¶ 4.
“Disposable income” is computed by taking the income of the applicant together with that of the spouse (if
any) during the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of application and deducting the
following sums: S$3500 per annum for each dependant, S$4500 for the applicant, an amount not
exceeding S$1000 for rent, and the amount of the applicant’s contribution to the CPF. Id.
280
Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, § 8(2)(a) (1996).
281
Id. § 8(3) (stating where “it appears to [the Director] unreasonable that the applicant should
receive [legal aid] in the particular circumstances of the case . . .”).
282
The lawyer’s fee for “investigating and reporting or giving an opinion upon applications for the
grant of legal aid or giving legal advice” is only S$50 per hour for work done. See Rule 15(4), Legal Aid
and Advice Regulations, 1 October 1995 (pursuant to Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap. 160), § 23(1)). That
sum is minimal compared to the median billable hours of lawyers as reported in the CENSUS 2001, which
indicated the following rates: S$200-S$299 (for lawyers with fewer than three years of experience);
S$300-S$399 (for lawyers with three to twelve years of experience); and S$400–S$499 (for lawyers with
twelve or more years of experience). CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 4.
283
Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 38(1)(f) (2001) (stating that under the Legal Profession Act, one
of the objectives of the Law Society is to “protect and assist the public in Singapore in all matters touching
or ancillary or incidental to the law”). One example of civil legal aid undertaken by the Law Society is the
Project Law Help, set up in 2004 to “1) make provision[s] for a scheme by which legal practices and
advocates and solicitors can provide pro bono non-litigation commercial legal advice to charities, nonprofit organizations and voluntary welfare organizations; and 2) facilitate, promote, support and encourage
a sustainable commitment to pro bono work within the legal profession in Singapore.” LawSociety.org,
Project Law Help, http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/lawhelp/lawhelp.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
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private organizations284 in Singapore also provide legal aid in both litigation
and non-litigation matters.
While the Singapore judiciary has no direct role in assigning counsel
with regard to civil cases, it has nevertheless taken positive steps to
encourage pro bono work amongst Singapore lawyers. The Singapore
judiciary has sought to encourage pro bono work amongst the lawyers as a
“professional value,” and in this regard, a judicial commissioner was
appointed to chair the Singapore Academy of Law’s Committee on Pro Bono
Work.285 Notably, the Singapore High Court also assigns an advocate and
solicitor to a vexatious litigant who is “unable on account of poverty” to
engage a lawyer.286 In addition, within the family court there are legal
clinics staffed by volunteer lawyers who provide legal advice to persons in
the low-income category.287
With respect to criminal cases, the Singapore government does not
provide legal aid due to its perception of conflicts of interests and roles.288
This gap is filled by the Law Society and private organizations providing
legal assistance. As mentioned above, the Law Society is statutorily obliged
to “make provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme whereby
impecunious persons on non-capital charges are represented by
advocates.”289 Private lawyers under the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme

284
The Singapore Association of Women Lawyers (“SAWL”), an affiliate of the Singapore Council
of Women’s Organizations (the national umbrella organization of women’s organizations), has conducted
free legal counseling to members of the public since 1976.
See SAWL.org, About Us,
http://www.sawl.org.sg/about.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). This service is presently provided to the
public in various community centers and the Family Court. Id. Other private organizations, such as the
Catholic Lawyers Guild Singapore, also provide legal assistance to those in need.
See
http://clgsingapore.com/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
285
See Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, Singapore Supreme Court, Welcome Reference for the Chief
Justice: Response By the Honourable Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong (Apr. 22, 2006), available at
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgid=1001&printFriendly=true; see THE LAW SOCIETY OF
SINGAPORE, LEGAL AID REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE REPORT 4 (on file with
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal) [hereinafter LEGAL AID REVIEW REPORT]; see also Rajah & Tann,
LLP, http://www.rajahtann.com/RajahTannCMS/partners.aspx?pid=232 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008)
(showing that Sundaresh Menon, the Judicial Commissioner previously appointed to chair the committee,
has since left for private legal practice).
286
See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322, § 74 (1999).
287
See The Subordinate Courts of Singapore Family Justice Division, Services: Overview,
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/page.aspx?pageid=38742 (last visited May 4, 2008).
288
See 76 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, col. 715 (noting Associate Professor Ho Peng
Kee’s comment that “I think I have explained why, philosophically, jurisprudentially, practically, it does
not make sense for the State to both prosecute and then defend, in the public interest. Do not forget, when
the State prosecutes, it goes through a very detailed process and the conclusion is that this person has done
something which ought to be punished. The right hand says, ‘Let’s punish him.’ The left hand says, ‘Let’s
get him out.’ So the two are being pulled apart.”).
289
Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 38(g) (2001).
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(“CLAS”) of the Singapore Law Society have been active in this regard.290
A new pro bono service department has been set up by the Law Society to
manage pro bono initiatives, including CLAS.291 Lawyers from the
Association of Criminal Lawyers,292 a separate private entity, have also
volunteered to provide pro bono assistance to accused persons. Insofar as
the Singapore judiciary is concerned, the courts play a limited, yet important
role, pursuant to the court rules in assigning lawyers to represent the accused
under a capital charge.293
Litigants who cannot qualify for state legal aid and who are unable to
obtain the services of a lawyer willing to take up a case on a pro bono basis
are bereft of formal legal assistance unless they are willing and able to
engage and pay a private lawyer. The Singapore lawyer is prohibited from
entering into contingency fee agreements with clients,294 notwithstanding
that such agreements would enhance access to justice for persons of limited
means.295 Moreover, relaxing the current prohibition against contingency
fees agreements between lawyers and clients could provide the flexibility
which the legal aid system lacks, though contingency fees models admittedly
have their fair share of obstacles to surmount before proper
implementation.296 Alternatively, the litigant can seek informal legal advice
from professional lawyers without the benefit of formal legal representation
in court. Another option which has not been pursued actively in Singapore
is the extension of limited rights of legal representation to paralegals for
simpler and cost-effective legal assistance for more routine matters.
Currently, non-lawyers such as paralegals are prohibited by statute from
providing legal advice to clients;297 therefore any conferment of the rights of
legal representation on the paralegal would require legislative reform. A
further recourse would be to seek the assistance of McKenzie298 friends or
290

See generally Tracy Sua, Calling All Lawyers: Legal Aid Scheme Needs Help, STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore) (Feb. 1, 2007) (noting that in 2006, CLAS had about 360 volunteers who handled 319 criminal
cases, which was more than twice the number of cases handled in 2005).
291
Law Society of Singapore: Pro Bono Services, http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/pro_bono/index.asp
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
292
The Association was registered on Aug. 3, 2004 under the Societies Act, ch. 311 (1985).
293
Sing. Sup. Ct. (Crim. App.) Rules, R. 11(a) (1997).
294
Supra note 22.
295
See generally Chan, supra note 19; see generally Adrian Yeo, Access to Justice: A Case for
Contingency Fees in Singapore, 16 SING. ACAD. L. J. 76 (2004).
296
See Chan, supra note 19 (noting that contingency fees raise professional ethics issues, including
the lawyer’s susceptibility to conflicts of interests, and the lawyer’s improper assessment of risks at the
expense of clients).
297
See Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 33 (2001) (providing sanctions for unauthorized persons who
act as advocates and solicitors). Section 32 provides that an unauthorized person is one whose name is not
entered in the roll of advocates and solicitors or does not have in force a practicing certificate. Id. at § 32.
298
This term is based on the famous English case of McKenzie v. McKenzie, [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034.
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lay assistants who may help to take notes during court proceedings and
provide moral support. Like paralegals, these McKenzie friends and lay
assistants in Singapore are not, as will be apparent below, entitled to provide
the legal advice that is currently the sole domain of the qualified lawyer.
There is clearly a need to explore possible solutions to improve access
to justice for the litigant who is ineligible for legal aid and is unable to afford
legal representation. A Legal Aid Review Committee was set up recently
under the auspices of the Law Society in order to seek inputs from, inter alia,
the Singapore Academy of Law committee on pro bono work which was
chaired by a judicial commissioner.299 The Committee made new and
significant recommendations, some of which have since been crystallized in
a set of “Key Initiatives” issued by the Singapore Law Society. These “Key
Initiatives” included proposals for the LAB means test criteria to be
relaxed300 and recommended that civil legal aid assistance be extended to the
fortieth percentile of Singapore’s average household income.301 This
eventually led to a relaxation of the means test via an increase in the
threshold income pursuant to recent amendments to the Legal Aid and
Advice Act in 2007.302 The Law Society had also recommended that law
firms pledge to ensure that lawyers perform a minimum of twenty-five hours
of pro bono work annually.303 Coupled with the proposal to set up legal
clinics by the LAB,304 the recommendations represent important milestones
in extending the reach of civil legal aid to Singaporeans. In conjunction,
CLAS has significantly raised the individual income ceiling in respect of
criminal cases.305 These recent moves are indeed laudable.
In Singapore, it appears the strategy to increase access to justice for
indigent litigants is two-pronged: the provision of state legal aid and the
utilization of private pro bono services, moving in tandem.306 The recent
299

See LEGAL AID REVIEW REPORT, supra note 285, at 1.
The qualifying monthly household income for a family of four of S$1900 will be increased to
about S$2600. See Marcel Lee Pereira, More People to Get Lawyers’ Advice in Civil Cases, STRAITS
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007).
301
See The Law Society of Singapore, Key Initiatives Of The Law Society Following
Recommendations Made By The Legal Aid Review Committee As Set Out In Its Report Dated December 8,
2006 (on file with the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal).
302
Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, (Act 310 of 2007 – Legal Aid and Advice (Amendment) Act
2007). This amendment went into effect on July 1, 2007.
303
According to the CENSUS 2001, the average time spent on pro bono work per lawyer from
November 2000 to October 2001 was 32 hours and respondents considered the appropriate average time
spent on pro bono work should be 46 hours. CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at vii, 114.
304
See Khushwant Singh, Income Ceiling for Aid to be Upped to $1700: Needy Get Better Access to
Legal Aid for Civil, Criminal Cases, STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007).
305
Id.
306
This two-pronged approach is also consistent with the principle adopted by the Centre for Legal
Process, Law Foundation of New South Wales that “[p]ro bono legal services complement, and do not
300
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initiatives buck the trend in other developed countries where state legal aid
is being reduced while pro bono work is encouraged to fill the gaps left by
declining state legal aid.307 Not surprisingly, this trend in other developed
nations has not been well received by all quarters.308 Singapore is
experimenting with pro bono services during these initial stages and at least
for now, pro bono work is only encouraged, rather than being mandatory.309
b.

Concrete Steps by the Singapore Judiciary to Enhance Access to
Justice for Litigants in Person and Suggestions for Reform

The increase in the number of litigants in person310 in developed
countries311 should prompt us to closely examine the manner and extent of
their access to the courts. Within the Singapore Subordinate Courts, the
proportion of unrepresented litigants in maintenance cases and family
violence cases respectively is very significant.312
Furthermore, the
percentage of unrepresented litigants in divorce cases is fairly high.313 In
view of the figures, it is therefore important to find out if more assistance,
whether of a legal or non-legal nature, should be provided to such litigants in
replace, publicly funded legal services.” See LAW AND JUSTICE FOUNDATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES,
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW SOUTH WALES 8 (Access to Justice Series,
2002).
307
See generally Francis Regan, Legal Aid Without The State: Assessing The Rise of Pro Bono
Schemes, 33 UNIV. B.C. L. REV. 383 (1999-2000). For a view that the provision of pro bono work is itself
vulnerable to market forces in the United States. see Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and
American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 L. & SOC. REV. 79 (2007).
308
See e.g., Andrew Boon & Robert Abbey, Moral Agendas? Pro Bono Publico in Large Law Firms
in the United Kingdom, 60 MOD. L. REV. 630, 634 (1997) (providing an example of a trend not well
received). In the United Kindgom., the Law Society’s Pro Bono Working Party pointed out that pro bono
publico must not be seen as a substitute for legal aid. Id.
309
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 6.1 (2002) (stating “[e]very lawyer has a professional
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least
fifty (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year . . . .”).
310
Commonly referred to as pro se litigants in the United States and unrepresented litigtants in
Australia.
311
With respect to England, see George Applebey, Justice Without Lawyers? Litigants in Person in
the English Civil Courts, 18 HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1997); for Hong Kong, see RESOURCE
CTR. FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON RESOURCE CENTRE FOR
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, ¶ 1.2, available at http://rcul.judiciary.gov.hk/rc/eng/screport/
RC%20Report.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE CTR. FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS].
312
For 2005, the figures were 95.2% (maintenance cases: complainants only); 99.3% (maintenance
cases: respondents only); 96.5% (family violence: complainants only) and 99.7% (family violence:
respondents only) respectively. In 2006, the corresponding figures for the first three categories had
increased slightly to 96.0%, 99.6% and 97.1%, while the figure for family violence: respondents only
decreased marginally to 99.3%. The statistics have been kindly provided by the Subordinate Courts (on file
with the author).
313
In 2005, the percentages of unrepresented litigants were 39.1% (divorce: plaintiffs only) and
39.0% (divorce: defendants only). In 2006, the figures have increased to 43.2% and 43.1% respectively.
The statistics have been kindly provided by the Subordinate Courts (on file with the author).
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person to attain, as far as possible, equal access to justice vis-à-vis other
litigants with legal representation.
An in-house study was conducted by the Subordinate Courts in 2005
on Parties in Person in both the family court and SCTs.314 As the users of
SCTs are not permitted legal representation to begin with, it might be more
useful to focus on litigants in the family court who could have engaged
lawyers but were not legally represented for various reasons. A majority of
the litigants in person in the family court were in the low-income group.315
Of the reasons cited for being self-represented, the majority (55%) said they
could not afford a lawyer while a smaller proportion (29%) felt they did not
require the services of a lawyer.316 In terms of legal needs, the respondents
ranked the need for information as follows: court procedures (52.1%),
relevant law (29.6%), and court room formalities (22.9%).317 The study also
revealed a lack of awareness among the respondents concerning the LAB
and the services and programs provided by the Subordinate Courts (such as
the Multi-Door Courthouse, information brochures, the family court legal
clinic and the judiciary website) to assist litigants in person.318 However, for
the litigants in person who have utilized the services, the majority response
was that the court location, facilities, information, and services were
accessible.319
To the author’s knowledge, there has yet to be a significant study
conducted on the litigation performance of litigants in person as compared to
litigants with legal representation in Singapore. Nevertheless, research
conducted in the United Kingdom and Australia suggests that litigants in
person are likely to perform worse than their legally-represented
counterparts in accordance with certain specified comparators. In the United
Kingdom, a recent study by Moorhead and Sefton on four English courts, in
first instance civil and family proceedings, indicated that litigants in person
tended to commit more mistakes than litigants with legal representation and,
further, that the litigants in person were more likely to make more serious
errors.320 The types of mistakes examined in the study included errors which
are obvious from the file, which concern procedural and administrative
314
315

See CReST Paper, supra note 25, at 4.
The majority (68%) had monthly incomes of less than S$1500 and the average income is S$1075.

Id.
316

Id.
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id. The paper did not define the term “accessible.”
320
RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, DEP’T OF CONST, AFF., LITIGANTS IN PERSON:
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 151 (2005), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/2_2005.pdf.
317
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matters (as opposed to an assessment of the merits of the case or the
strategies adopted by litigants), fundamental misunderstandings of relevant
issues, and failures to address essential aspects of a case.321 The evidence
also suggested that the litigants in person experienced more problems with
documentation.322 Another study conducted in Australia has focused on the
inadequacies of litigants in person or, alternatively, the relative success rates
in litigation, the likelihood of discontinuation of a case and the likelihood of
having to pay the costs of the other party.323
Cognizant of the need to provide more assistance to litigants in
person, the Subordinate Courts of Singapore have initiated a pilot Lay
Assistant Scheme whereby law students324 may provide non-legal assistance
to litigants in person such as taking notes at hearings and performing
administrative tasks.325 The scope of the scheme is limited to litigants in
person involved in maintenance cases pursuant to the Women’s Charter.326
The pilot project relates only to applications for the maintenance of the wife
and children where: 1) one party is legally represented and 2) the litigant in
person is unable to afford a lawyer and has chosen not to apply for one or

321

Id. at 129.
Id. at 139.
See Helen Gamble & Richard Mohr, Litigants in Person in the Federal Court of Australia and the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (unpublished paper presented to the Sixteenth AIJA Annual Conference
Melbourne (Sept. 4-6, 1998)), available at http://www.uow.edu.au/law/crt/litigants.html. This is a
collaborative research project to evaluate the impact of litigants in person on the management of judicial
business conducted jointly by the Federal Court of Australia, Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Centre for
Court Policy and Administration, University of Wollongong and the Justice Research Centre in Sydney.
Id.
324
See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore,
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
These are law students from the Pro Bono Group, a student club set up under the Law Management
Council, Law Faculty, National University of Singapore (“NUS”). The website states that this group of law
students “strongly believe that volunteer legal service brings benefits to both the community and the
volunteer, and we seek to spread this message to our peers by informing them about the pro bono
movement in Singapore and to involve them in pro bono service.” See NUS Pro Bono Group, About Us,
http://nusprobono.wordpress.com/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
325
See Ansley Ng, Law Undergrads in Court’s Pilot Scheme, TODAYONLINE, Jan. 5, 2007. The
Singapore Management University runs a compulsory two-week community service attachment program
for its students. It is envisaged that the students from the School of Law may, under this program, pursue
attachments with organizations involved in legal aid and pro bono work. See SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY, BACHELOR OF LAWS PROGRAMME, http://www.law.smu.edu.sg/blaw/index.asp (last visited
May 4, 2008); see SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY, BACHELOR OF LAWS STUDENT HANDBOOK,
http://info.smu.edu.sg/courses/index.asp (follow “LLB Handbook” hyperlink) (last visited May 4, 2008).
326
See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore,
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007);
Women’s Charter, ch. 353 (1997 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.) (This Act was most recently amended in 2005),
available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “353” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the
“Women’s Charter” hyperlink).
322
323
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has not qualified for legal aid.327 Participation in the Lay Assistant Scheme
is voluntary.328 The Subordinate Courts emphasize that the availability of a
lay assistant is “not guaranteed and is not an entitlement.”329 The website of
the Subordinate Courts refers to a leaflet provided to the litigant in person
which briefly explains the Lay Assistance Scheme. It states that the lay
assistant may explain the hearing process to the litigant in person, assist in
the preparation of paper work, and take notes at the hearing.330 However, the
lay assistant cannot, inter alia, give legal advice or address the court unless
special permission is granted.331
Litigants are also entitled to seek the help of McKenzie friends in
Singapore courts.332 The English Court of Appeal recently stated that the
purpose of allowing a litigant in person the assistance of a McKenzie friend
is “to further the interests of justice by achieving a level playing field and
ensuring a fair hearing.”333 It is the litigant in person who possesses the
right to assistance, as opposed to the McKenzie friend’s right to act as
one.334 In the case of Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, Kan J., citing
English precedents335 in support, regarded a “McKenzie friend” who takes
his responsibilities seriously as a “help not only to the litigant who seeks his
assistance, but also to the court.”336 However, the learned judge cautioned
that those who abuse the privilege by disregarding directions of the court,
who pursue an agenda beyond helping the litigant, or who use the privilege
as a backdoor to legal practice should be excluded.337 In Wee Soon Kim
Anthony v. UBS AG, the learned judge rejected the litigant’s application for a
McKenzie friend as the person assisting the litigant in the case was intending

327
See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore,
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
328
Id.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
See generally Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833.
333
In the matter of the children of Mr O’Connell, Mr Whelan and Mr Watson [2005] E.W.C.A. (Civ.)
759, at ¶ 128(1) (Eng.); see also Lord Woolf M.R. in R v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling, [1999] 1
W.L.R. 1807, 1825 (Eng.) (stating “the help which a McKenzie friend can properly give a litigant in person
could assist in achieving equality between the parties . . . .”) [hereinafter Pelling].
334
Pelling, supra note 333, at 1824.
335
McKenzie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034; Regina v. Leicester City Justices ex. P. Barrow,
(1991) 2 Q.B. 260 (U.K.); Pelling, supra note 333.
336
Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833, ¶ 18; see also Office of the
President of the Family Division [2005] 35 Fam. 405 (U.K.) (emphasizing in the guidance notes that the
presumption in favor of McKenzie friends is a “strong” one).
337
Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833, ¶ 18.
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to make the submissions to the court on behalf of the litigant in person as if
he were an advocate, going beyond the role allotted to a McKenzie friend.338
The proper role and perspective of a judge in a court proceeding
toward a litigant in person has also been judicially examined in Singapore.339
The scope for direct legal assistance provided by a judge to a litigant in
person in a court case is, not surprisingly, fairly restricted. In Soong Hee
Sin, the court stated that the district judge has no duty to advise the accused
of the significance or relevance of restitution in sentencing.340 As such, the
failure of the judge to do so did not vitiate his subsequent discretion in
sentencing.341 The learned judge explained that the role of a judge was to
serve as “an independent and unbiased adjudicator” and hence a judge
should not “proffer or extend his own legal advice” to the disputing
parties.342
Although the judges should be impartial and refrain from providing
legal advice to the litigants, the judiciary can do more to assist the litigants
in person. This Article proposes that the judiciary should also, as a matter of
practice, provide information directly to the litigants in person of the
availability of legal aid prior to the hearing. Where the litigant in person
does not qualify for legal aid, the judge should explain to the litigant in
simple terms the main purpose of the hearing as well as some basic aspects
of court procedures and formalities to level the playing field, where the other
party is legally represented. In conjunction, the court administrators could
also ensure that such information be made available to the litigants prior to
the hearing to reduce the time spent by the judge to educate the litigant on
court formalities and procedures.
Apart from the Lay Assistant Scheme and McKenzie friends, the
Subordinate Courts have provided a court concierge service to assist
members of the public with directions to court rooms and information on
court schedules.343 The Singapore Subordinate Courts have stated clearly on
the judiciary website the roles and responsibilities of court staff with respect
338

Id. ¶ 19. In the United Kingdom, the rights of audience of a person who is not an advocate and
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to disputes commenced at the family court.344 For example, court staff will
help litigants find hearing lists and contact details for the Legal Aid Bureau
and Law Society, but will stop short of providing legal advice and advice on
the language used for court documentation.345 Further, the court website
provides useful information on the possible non-litigious avenues for
litigants in person such as the Community Mediation Unit and the Ministry
of Community Development, Youth, and Sports.346 Additionally, it sets out
the appropriate court behavior for litigants unfamiliar with court procedures
and etiquette.347 With respect to disputes dealt with by the SCTs, the
Subordinate Courts have, as stated above, provided a user-friendly DIY kit
on matters relating to filing claims at SCTs, form-filling procedures, simple
checklists of items which serve as reminders for litigants,
consultation/mediation processes, and preparations for court hearings.348 For
the benefit of litigants in person, in civil cases, the court provides a write-up
outlining procedures from the commencement of a civil action to the court
judgment and appeal.349
c.

Recommendations for Enhancing Access to Justice for Litigants in
Person

The Singapore judiciary has indeed taken concrete and extensive steps
to enhance access to justice for litigants in person. Some comparisons may
also be made with developments elsewhere as the Singapore judiciary
continually seeks refinements and improvements.
In particular, the following initiatives, which have been implemented
in other common law jurisdictions to augment access to justice for the poor,
warrant attention. In Hong Kong, for instance, the judiciary is pro-active in
consciously integrating and coordinating the provision of legal assistance by
legal professionals, non-governmental organizations, and other bodies
through a dedicated Resource Centre at the judiciary premises.350 In
Australia, the federal courts provide a Referral for Legal Assistance
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Scheme.351 Each of the Australian courts has a list of pro bono practitioners
who have agreed to provide pro bono work.352
Having a list of pro bono lawyers, at the convenient access of the
litigant in person, would assist in saving time and costs in seeking lawyers.
However, should the Singapore judiciary play a more pro-active role in
providing a list of lawyers willing to provide pro bono work, there should be
an explicit caveat that the pro bono lawyers are not the recommendations of
the judges, but merely provided for informational purposes. Otherwise,
there may be criticisms of judicial biases and conflicts of interests in the
choice of lawyers in a particular case.
Apart from education on court procedures and formalities,
transparency and public access to the proper judicial treatment towards
litigants in person are also paramount. The Judicial Studies Board, the body
established in 1979 and responsible for training judges in England and
Wales, has drafted guidelines (the Equal Treatment Bench Book) on the
proper approaches courts should adopt towards the poor and other
disadvantaged litigants in proceedings—in short, equal access to justice.353
For instance, the Bench Book encourages the court to clearly explain its
decision and the reasons therefore to litigants in person, including drawing
to their attention the question of costs and rights of appeal.354 It urges judges
not to see litigants in person as a problem for the judiciary, but rather to
examine their needs.355 The Bench Book focuses on unrepresented parties
and the difficulties they face (such as unfamiliarity with the law and court
procedures), and it provides guidance for judges to ensure a fair hearing.356
One section on “Poverty and the county courts” provides information for the
benefit of judges on the following: the work of the county courts in helping
creditors to recover monies from debtors, the scale of poverty in Britain, the
benefits system, the minimum wage and tax credits system, and mortgage
repossession cases.357 Thus, the English judges are expected to be aware of
the circumstances facing financially disadvantaged litigants and the benefits
available to such individuals. To reinforce the role poverty plays in
351
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impacting access to justice, the Bench Book also makes ample reference to
Community Legal Service (managed by the Legal Services Commission) to
aid the poor in obtaining legal assistance as well as civil legal aid.358 Judges
are advised to adjourn or postpone proceedings in appropriate cases to
enable the litigant in question to obtain legal assistance and to direct the
unrepresented litigants to appropriate legal help as required.359
This Article proposes that the Singapore judiciary should examine the
Equal Treatment Bench Book carefully (in particular, the portions on
litigants in person and poverty issues) which may be adapted for use to
improve access to justice for the poor in Singapore. In order to improve
public awareness of the judicial roles, there should also be transparent access
of the guidelines to members of the public. As discussed above, the
Singapore judiciary has undertaken great efforts to allow greater public
access to its court judgments and technological facilities. Access to judicial
guidelines on the proper treatment of litigants in person and indigent
litigants should follow as a corollary.
Finally, under this third institutional approach, this Part has examined
the use of the SCTs’ processes to reduce legal costs for litigants in person.
Technological advancements within the Singapore judiciary have, on the
whole, improved the administration of justice in Singapore, without
compromising access to justice for indigent litigants. However, some areas
still need improvement. While court-based mediation has enabled the
resolution of a large majority of cases without the need for prolonged trials,
questions still linger on the practicality of mediation in a situation of serious
inequality of power (including financial prowess) between the litigants, such
as where a large corporation is opposed by a financially disadvantaged
litigant. Comparative developments in Hong Kong, Australia, and England
can further assist the Singapore judiciary in refining approaches in the
coordination of legal aid and pro bono work, as well as in the provision of
assistance to litigants in person.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Doing justice must count as at least one of the central tasks of the
judiciary and the paramount objective of achieving equal access to justice
cannot remain as mere rhetoric. In this regard, the scorecard is, on the
whole, a positive one. The overall efforts of the Singapore judiciary in
enhancing access to justice have been fairly comprehensive and proactive.
358
359
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Despite the absence of a strong rights-based constitutional jurisprudence
relating to access to justice, the concrete plans and programs implemented
by the judiciary, coupled with significant public policy statements by its top
echelons, speak volumes of the drive to attain greater access to justice for
the poor. It is fair to say that, based on the three approaches examined above
(economic, procedural and institutional), the judicial practice working
towards access to justice in Singapore has surpassed its constitutional
rhetoric.
However, the Singapore judiciary should attempt to further improve
access to justice for the poor as recommended in Part III above. This task of
maintaining and promoting access to justice for the poor is by no means an
easy one. It requires continual and painstaking endeavors in close
coordination and cooperation with efforts undertaken by other state organs
such as the Legal Aid Bureau, the Law Society, and other private
organizations, underscored by a strong desire to “do justice” for the poor.

